– State v. Jenkins –, 455 P.3d 779

On Feb. 4, 2016, Jenkins led two separate vehicle pursuits in the Topeka area; the second chase in his stolen pickup ended in a collision that killed a passenger and injured others.
Jenkins was arrested, taken to the hospital, then booked into Shawnee County Jail where he was assigned a unique Securus PIN and made six outgoing calls on Feb. 5, 2016.
The State played five recorded jail calls at trial; Jenkins objected, arguing the State failed to adequately identify him as the male speaker.
Trial evidence included officer testimony and bodycam video documenting numerous moving violations during the pickup pursuit; jury was instructed with a list of specific statutes constituting "moving violations."
Jenkins was convicted of first-degree felony murder (merging one fleeing count), aggravated batteries, fleeing and eluding (two counts), theft, driving without taillights, and driving while suspended; he appealed claiming (1) improper admission of jail calls and (2) that the "moving violations" element of the fleeing-and-eluding statute is unconstitutionally vague.
The Kansas Supreme Court affirmed: it held the jail calls were properly authenticated under the minimal-burden standard of the Kansas Rules of Evidence and rejected the vagueness challenge to K.S.A. 2015 Supp. 8-1568(b)(1)(E).

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (State)	Defendant's Argument (Jenkins)	Held
Admissibility/authentication of jail phone calls	Securus PIN is unique to Jenkins; call content, timing, and custodial records support authenticity; any doubt goes to weight not admissibility.	PIN alone is insufficient to ID speaker; Williams seven-factor voice-identification test required.	Calls admissible. Kansas abandons rigid Williams seven-factor approach; authentication is minimal under K.S.A. 60-464/60-401 and State v. Robinson — circumstantial evidence and call contents suffice.
Vagueness of "moving violations" in K.S.A. 2015 Supp. 8-1568(b)(1)(E)	The term is defined by K.A.R. 92-52-9 and by specific statutes listed to give fair notice; jury received statutory definitions.	The phrase is vague and not intuitive; disparate regulatory definitions (e.g., Corp. Comm.) create ambiguity, so statute permits arbitrary enforcement.	Term not unconstitutionally vague. Regulatory and statutory scheme (K.A.R. 92-52-9 and listed statutes) provides fair notice and guards against arbitrary enforcement; rule of lenity does not apply.

State v. Williams, 235 Kan. 485 (1984) (historic seven-factor test for audio-recording authentication)
State v. Robinson, 303 Kan. 11 (2015) (authentication burden is minimal; indirect evidence suffices)
State v. Richardson, 290 Kan. 176 (2010) (discusses complexity of defining "moving violations")
State v. Milum, 202 Kan. 196 (1968) (contents of a writing can authenticate author when showing unique knowledge)
State v. Dale, 293 Kan. 660 (2011) (recordings qualify as "writings" under Kansas Rules of Evidence)
United States v. Westmoreland, 312 F.3d 302 (7th Cir. 2002) (rejects formalistic checklist in favor of Rule 901(a)-style authenticity analysis)