State v. James, 227 W. Va. 407

Three West Virginia cases consolidated on appeal challenge WV Code § 62-12-26, the extended supervision statute, as facially unconstitutional and/or as applied.
Statute requires a period of supervised release, up to 50 years (or 10 years for certain offenses) in addition to incarceration, for enumerated felonies.
James: plea to first degree sexual abuse; 1–5 year prison term; 30 years of supervised release imposed.
Hedrick: two counts of first degree sexual abuse; 2–10 year prison terms; 25 years of supervised release.
Daniels: guilty plea to third degree sexual assault; 1–5 year prison term; 10 years of supervised release.
Court reviews challenges under cruel and unusual punishment, due process, and double jeopardy doctrine, and affirms trial court sentences.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Is WV § 62-12-26 facially unconstitutional as cruel and unusual punishment?	James/Hedrick contend it shocks conscience and is disproportionate.	State argues it is a legislative policy choice to protect society and is not inherently disproportionate.	Not facially unconstitutional.
Does § 62-12-26 violate due process by allowing judicially imposed supervised release without a jury?	Apprendi-based challenge; increases to penalty require jury fact-finding.	Statutory maximum is the combined sentence; no extra jury finding required.	No due process violation; no extra jury findings required.
Does § 62-12-26 violate vagueness principles or fail to provide fair notice?	Lacks uniform guidelines; creates arbitrary enforcement.	Court may tailor conditions; statute provides enough notice and standards.	Not facially vague; provides fair notice and standards.
Does § 62-12-26 violate double jeopardy by duplicating punishment or raise issues about credit for time served on supervision?	Supervised release constitutes additional punishment for the same offense; revocation could negate time served.	Legislature authorized multiple punishments; revocation credit issues are not yet ripe.	Not facially violative; revocation issue premature as to credit theory.

State v. Lucas, 201 W.Va. 271 (1997) (abuse-of-discretion standard for sentencing orders; statutory/constitutional questions insured)
State v. Rutherford, 223 W.Va. 1 (2008) (constitutional questions reviewed de novo; restraint in examining statutes)
Willis v. O'Brien, 151 W.Va. 628 (1967) (guidance on interpreting constitutional presumptions in statutes)
Appalachian Power Co. v. Gainer, 149 W.Va. 740 (1965) (judicial restraint in evaluating legislative power; avoid negating statutes)
Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277 (1983) (deference to legislative authority in punishment determinations)
Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000) (any fact increasing penalty beyond statutory maximum must be jury-found)
Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004) (statutory maximum for Apprendi purposes is determined by facts found by jury)
Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 (1972) (vagueness concerns require definitional clarity to avoid arbitrary enforcement)
State v. Flinn, 158 W.Va. 111 (1974) (vagueness challenges to criminal penalties require definite definitions)
State v. Myers v. Wood, 154 W.Va. 431 (1970) (statutory vagueness standards for due process)
State v. Sears, 196 W.Va. 71 (1996) (double jeopardy principles in sentencing context)