State v. Jama, 923 N.W.2d 632

On July 5, 2015, Mohamed Musa Jama exposed and fondled his penis on a public sidewalk and simulated sexual intercourse while within ~5 feet of four children (two infants, a 6-year-old, and a 12-year-old).
Jama was charged with gross-misdemeanor indecent exposure in the presence of a child under 16 under Minn. Stat. § 617.23, subd. 2.
Jama notified the State he would assert voluntary-intoxication as a defense and requested a jury instruction on that defense.
The district court denied the instruction, concluding the statute creates a general-intent crime (volitional act), and the jury convicted Jama; the court of appeals affirmed.
The Minnesota Supreme Court granted review to decide whether the indecent-exposure statute requires specific intent to be lewd (which would permit a voluntary-intoxication instruction).
The court held the statute creates a general-intent offense (prohibiting intentionally engaging in lewd conduct), so voluntary-intoxication is not an applicable defense; the conviction was affirmed.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether Minn. Stat. § 617.23 requires a specific intent to be lewd	State: statute prohibits intentionally engaging in lewd conduct (general intent)	Jama: prior cases (Peery, Stevenson) and wording require proof of specific intent to be lewd	Held: statute creates a general-intent crime; no specific-intent element required
Whether Peery/Stevenson added a specific-intent element	State: Peery/Stevenson require proof only that act was volitional, not subjective lewd intent	Jama: Peery’s phrase "deliberate intent of being indecent or lewd" imposes specific intent	Held: "deliberate" means volitional, not a separate specific-intent element
Whether the phrase "engages in" implies a higher mental state	State: "engages in" unambiguously means to take part in (volitional act)	Jama: textual ambiguity could support requiring specific intent	Held: plain meaning of "engages in" indicates general intent; no further mens rea required
Whether the district court erred by not instructing on voluntary intoxication	Jama: absence of instruction was plain error if offense requires specific intent	State: voluntary-intoxication instruction unnecessary for general-intent crimes	Held: no error; voluntary-intoxication instruction not warranted because offense is general intent

State v. Fleck, 810 N.W.2d 303 (Minn. 2012) (distinguishes general vs. specific intent; general intent requires volitional act)
State v. Wilson, 830 N.W.2d 849 (Minn. 2013) (explains specific-intent crimes require intent to cause a particular result)
State v. Peery, 28 N.W.2d 851 (Minn. 1947) (reversed conviction where exposure appeared accidental; uses "deliberate" to contrast volitional acts with carelessness)
State v. Stevenson, 656 N.W.2d 235 (Minn. 2003) (interprets Peery: focus on likelihood conduct would be observed rather than defendant's subjective intent)
State v. Prince, 206 N.W.2d 660 (Minn. 1973) (example of conduct plainly within open lewdness; supports application of statute to publicly observed acts)