State v. Jackson, 295 Ga. 825

Marcus Jackson was convicted by a jury; the trial court granted a new trial, but this Court reversed the grant on direct appeal because the trial court had based relief solely on legal insufficiency rather than acting as the "thirteenth juror."
On remand, this Court’s remittitur was filed; the trial court (via Judge Tusan) entered an order making this Court’s judgment the trial-court judgment.
Two days after the remittitur, Jackson filed a motion invoking OCGA §§ 5-5-20 and 5-5-21; Judge Shoob (apparently no longer assigned) entered an order, post-remittitur, granting a new trial under those statutes.
Jackson had expressly amended and limited his motion for new trial at the original hearing to proceed solely on a sufficiency-of-the-evidence ground and waived all other grounds.
The State appealed the post-remittitur grant; the Supreme Court of Georgia held the trial court lacked jurisdiction to grant a new trial after remittitur on grounds Jackson had waived and that the appellate judgment was final and controlling.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether trial court had jurisdiction after remittitur to grant a new trial on grounds waived at original hearing	Jackson argued remand permitted the trial court to rule on a newly filed motion under OCGA §§ 5-5-20/21	State argued remittitur made this Court’s reversal final and trial court lacked power to grant new relief	Court held trial court lacked jurisdiction; remittitur made appellate judgment final and binding
Effect of Jackson’s express waiver of other new-trial grounds	Jackson attempted to revive "thirteenth juror" review post-remittitur	State maintained waiver precluded later relief on those grounds	Court held waiver was binding; relief on waived grounds too late after remittitur
Whether a trial judge no longer assigned to the case (Judge Shoob) could enter the post-remittitur order	Jackson relied on the order she signed	State argued Judge Shoob lacked authority if case reassigned	Court noted reassignment evidence and ruled Judge Shoob lacked authority to enter the order if not assigned
Whether prior appellate reversal implicitly authorized further trial-court action or retrial	Jackson claimed reversal left posture permitting retrial under 5-5-20/21	State argued the prior opinion reversed sole ground and left no further issues for trial court	Court held prior opinion contained no direction authorizing further action; only duty was to make appellate judgment the trial judgment and deny new trial

State v. Jackson, 294 Ga. 9 (2013) (prior appeal reversing trial-court grant of new trial)
Shepherd v. Shepherd, 243 Ga. 253 (1979) (appellate judgment final; trial court lacks authority to reinstate reversed relief)
Akins v. State, 237 Ga. 826 (1976) (appellate judgment conclusive of matters in issue)
Strickland & Smith, Inc. v. Williamson, 281 Ga. App. 784 (2006) (civil remand principles discussed; distinguishes posture where remand requires retrial)
Wilson v. Wilson, 279 Ga. 302 (2005) (reversal may require retrial when opinion necessarily implies further proceedings)