State v. Jackson, 498 P.3d 788

Background:

Defendant charged (single indictment) with four murders (1983–1993) of young Black women engaged in prostitution; DNA consistent with defendant found at each scene.
State moved to cross-admit DNA and other-scene evidence in each murder trial under the doctrine of chances to rebut expected defense that DNA presence was coincidence from lawful contact.
Trial court held a three-day hearing, received expert testimony, and denied cross-admission on three grounds: state failed foundational proof for doctrine-of-chances, the doctrine was being misapplied to prove identity (not merely intent), and admission would amount to prohibited character/propensity evidence under OEC 404(3).
Trial court severed the counts; state sought direct interlocutory appeal to the Oregon Supreme Court under ORS 138.045; defendant challenged the court’s appellate jurisdiction.
Oregon Supreme Court affirmed: (1) it had jurisdiction ("suppressing evidence" interpreted broadly to include exclusion on evidentiary grounds); (2) doctrine of chances alone is insufficient to render other-crime DNA evidence relevant to a particular charged crime; and (3) the state failed to articulate a non-character chain of inference linking the group-level statistical inference to identity of the actor.

Issues:

Issue	State's Argument	Jackson's Argument	Held
Whether the Supreme Court has jurisdiction under ORS 138.045 to hear an interlocutory appeal of the trial court’s exclusion of evidence	"Suppressing evidence" includes any pretrial order excluding evidence the state wishes to introduce	"Suppressing evidence" should be read narrowly to mean only exclusion based on unconstitutional collection (motions to suppress)	Court upheld broad precedent: jurisdiction exists for appeal of evidentiary exclusion orders
Whether the doctrine of chances, by itself, makes other-crime DNA evidence relevant to prove identity in a charged murder	Doctrine of chances (statistical improbability of repeated rare events) provides a non-character theory of relevance and so renders other-scene DNA admissible to prove identity	Doctrine alone is insufficient; it yields only an intermediate inference about the group of events, not about any particular charged event	Doctrine of chances alone is insufficient to make other-scene evidence relevant to a specific charged crime
Whether the state articulated a permissible non-character chain of inferences linking the doctrine-of-chances inference to the charged crime (identity)	Even if doctrine alone is insufficient, the state’s chain—(1) improbability of coincidence for the group; (2) therefore defendant was present at each scene; (3) therefore defendant was the killer—relies on probabilistic reasoning, not propensity	That chain either fails to bridge the group-to-individual inference or depends on impermissible character/propensity reasoning (i.e., that defendant likely killed other victims)	Court held the state failed to link the group-level inference to the individual charged crime without relying on prohibited character/propensity inferences; exclusion affirmed

Key Cases Cited

State v. Skillicorn, 367 Or 464 (recasted doctrine of chances; limited Johns and emphasized that the doctrine addresses improbability of a series of chance events and does not justify propensity reasoning)
State v. Johns, 301 Or 535 (earlier Oregon decision that admitted prior misconduct under doctrine of chances but later criticized for employing propensity reasoning)
State v. Leistiko, 352 Or 172 (doctrine of chances limited to rebutting claims of accident/inadvertence; warns against using it to prove the act or identity)
State v. Tena, 362 Or 514 (reiterated that doctrine of chances applies to intentionality, not to prove whether defendant performed the act at all)
State v. Hess, 342 Or 647 (interpreting "suppressing evidence" broadly for purposes of interlocutory review)
State v. Koennecke, 274 Or 169 (allowing interlocutory review of orders excluding evidence on nonconstitutional grounds)
State v. Guzek, 322 Or 245 (relevance exists only as the relation between evidence and a proper matter to be proved)
State v. Ciancanelli, 339 Or 282 (stare decisis standards; party seeking to overrule precedent must persuade court to abandon it)