State v. Irish, 298 Neb. 61

Background

In March 2015, Bryant L. Irish was convicted under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 60-6,198 of causing serious bodily injury while driving under the influence (Class IIIA felony). The statute requires the court, as part of the judgment, to order a driving prohibition and license revocation for a period between 60 days and 15 years.
At sentencing the district court placed Irish on 60 months’ probation (with 180 days jail) and orally told him he could apply for an ignition interlock permit after 45 days of no driving, but the written judgment was silent on interlock eligibility and expressly revoked his license for 10 years.
Irish appealed the conviction on sufficiency grounds; the Nebraska Supreme Court affirmed in January 2016. He did not appeal the sentence within 30 days after sentencing.
In August and November 2016 Irish sought relief: a nunc pro tunc correction and then a motion to modify/clarify probation to reduce the revocation period or permit interlock eligibility. The district court denied relief, concluding it lacked authority to change the mandatory revocation imposed as part of the judgment.
Irish argued the court could modify probation conditions under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-2263(3) to reduce the revocation period; the State and the court pointed to § 60-6,198’s mandatory language making revocation part of the judgment rather than a probation condition.
The Nebraska Supreme Court dismissed Irish’s appeal, holding the district court lacked jurisdiction to entertain an untimely collateral attack on its sentencing order via a probation modification motion.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether the district court could modify or eliminate the license revocation by amending probation under § 29-2263(3)	Irish: § 29-2263(3) permits modification of probation conditions, so the court could reduce revocation and permit interlock eligibility	State: § 60-6,198 mandates license revocation as part of the judgment, not as a probation condition; court lacks authority to alter that via probation modification	Held: § 60-6,198 makes revocation a mandatory part of the judgment; court cannot reduce it via probation modification
Whether the court’s oral statement about interlock eligibility created an enforceable modification of the written sentence	Irish: oral pronouncement reflected court’s intent and should be effectuated	State: written judgment controls; statute does not authorize interlock for § 60-6,198 offenses	Held: Oral statement inconsistent with written judgment and statutory scheme; cannot override mandatory statutory revocation
Whether the district court had jurisdiction to entertain Irish’s post-sentencing challenge via probation motion after the 30-day appeal period	Irish: attempted to challenge sentence via probation motion (and nunc pro tunc)	State: in criminal cases the sentence is the judgment; appeal must be perfected within 30 days to challenge sentence	Held: Court lacked jurisdiction because Irish did not perfect a timely appeal from the sentence
Whether the Nebraska Constitution permits a court to commute the mandatory license revocation later	Irish: (implicitly) court can modify probation to achieve practical relief	State: separation of powers/precedent bars courts from commuting a mandatory part of judgment; only executive clemency processes apply	Held: Constitution and precedent prohibit courts from commuting a mandatory revocation that is part of the judgment

Key Cases Cited

State v. Hense, 276 Neb. 313 (court must impose mandatory license revocation as part of sentence)
State v. Donner, 13 Neb. App. 85 (license revocation is punishment, not a probation condition)
State v. Bainbridge, 249 Neb. 260 (15-year revocation treated as part of punishment; judicial commutation infringes separation of powers)
State v. Philipps, 246 Neb. 610 (separation-of-powers limits on reassigning commutation authority)
Dugan v. State, 297 Neb. 444 (in criminal cases the sentence is the judgment for appeal-timing rules)