State v. Hudson
209 N.J. 513
| N.J. | 2012Background
- Hudson was indicted in Monmouth County on 23 counts across two victims and the charges were severed for trial due to two separate victims.
- In the first trial, Hudson was convicted of offenses arising from February 7, 2006, and sentenced to an extended-term of seven years with 3.5 years’ parole ineligibility; other offenses ran concurrently with that term.
- In the second trial, offenses involving victim G.B. from February 8, 2006 led to convictions on Count 13 (second-degree aggravated assault) and Count 15 (fourth-degree unlawful possession of a weapon).
- The State sought an extended term in the second proceeding; the court found Hudson a persistent offender and imposed a five-year discretionary extended term on Count 13, consecutive to the first extended term, with Count 15 an 18-month flat sentence concurrent to Count 13 but consecutive to the prior sentence.
- Hudson’s aggregate sentence was 12 years with 5.5 years’ parole ineligibility, for offenses tried in separate proceedings.
- The Appellate Division affirmed; this Court held the second extended-term violated N.J.S.A. 2C:44-5(b)(1) and reversed the Count 13 extended term, remanding for resentencing.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Does N.J.S.A. 2C:44-5(b)(1) bar a second extended term when the second offense predates the prior sentence and is sentenced in a separate proceeding? | Hudson: subsections a and b prohibit multiple extended terms in separate proceedings. | State: subsections should conform to a wider discretion allowing a second extended term where appropriate. | Yes; second extended term prohibited; remand for resentencing on Count 13. |
| How should the phrase 'so far as possible' in 2C:44-5(b)(1) be interpreted? | Hudson: 'so far as possible' forbids multiple extended terms unless impossible to apply; strict interpretation. | State/AG: language provides discretion and is a residuum to avoid harsh outcomes; not absolute. | 'So far as possible' means prohibitions apply unless impossible to conform to subsection a. |
| Does the timing/severance of charges affect application of subsection b? | Hudson: severed proceedings must still respect subsection b if offenses fit its temporal scope. | State/AG: severed offenses can be treated as distinct proceedings; subsection b applies across proceedings. | Plain-language application of subsection b governs; its temporal focus governs this case. |
Key Cases Cited
- State v. Papasavvas, 163 N.J. 565 (2000) (limits multiple extended terms in a single proceeding)
- State v. Pennington, 154 N.J. 344 (1998) (limits on consecutive extended terms; reflects subsection a concept)
- State v. L.H., 206 N.J. 528 (2011) (discusses time gap considerations under subsection b)
- State v. Williams, 299 N.J. Super. 264 (1997) (two extended terms for different offenses in App.Div.)
- State v. Reldan, 231 N.J. Super. 232 (1989) (two different courts; similar reasoning to per-case limits)
- State v. McDonald, 209 N.J. 78 (2012) (companion case addressing similar subsections; extended-term concerns)