State v. Homan
181 Wash. 2d 102
Wash.2014Background
- A 37-year-old man, Russell Homan, rode past 9‑year‑old C.C.N. on a bicycle and said, “Do you want some candy? I’ve got some at my house.” Homan did not slow, stop, or look back.
- C.C.N. reported the comment to his mother; police located Homan and he admitted riding near the store area.
- Homan was charged, tried in a bench trial, convicted of luring under RCW 9A.40.090, and sentenced to 120 days.
- The Court of Appeals reversed for insufficiency of the evidence; the State appealed to the Washington Supreme Court.
- The Supreme Court granted review on sufficiency, held the evidence sufficient to support the luring conviction, and remanded to the Court of Appeals to resolve Homan’s First Amendment overbreadth challenge.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Sufficiency of evidence to convict for luring under RCW 9A.40.090 | State: Homan’s words constituted an invitation and enticement; viewed in context a trier of fact could find attempted luring beyond a reasonable doubt | Homan: Brief comment while riding by, without slowing or looking back, was not an invitation or attempt to lure into a nonpublic area | Court: Evidence was sufficient; words alone can constitute a lure and could reasonably be construed as inviting the child to the house |
| Whether Homan’s statement satisfied statutory elements “invitation” and “enticement” | State: “Do you want some candy? I’ve got some at my house” is both invitation and enticement under established definitions | Homan: Statement was only an offer of candy; absence of other conduct (no stopping or beckoning) shows no invitation | Court: Statute requires no particular form; the statement in context could be an implied invitation and enticement |
| Whether invitation had to be into a structure (vs. an obscured or nonpublic area) | State: Statute covers invitation into an area or structure obscured from public; invitation to a house implies entering a structure | Homan: Invitation to a house insufficient unless shown the house/area was nonpublic or secluded | Court: Statute’s text and legislative history cover both areas and structures; inviting to a house can imply entering a structure inaccessible to public |
| Overbreadth of RCW 9A.40.090 under the First Amendment | Homan: Statute is overbroad and may criminalize protected speech (calls inviting children in innocently) | State: Statute’s legitimate sweep—protecting children and disabled persons—outweighs speculative chill; affirmative defense limits misuse | Court: Declined to decide overbreadth on merits due to need for additional briefing; remanded to Court of Appeals for resolution |
Key Cases Cited
- In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (establishes beyond‑a‑reasonable‑doubt standard in criminal prosecutions)
- State v. Engel, 166 Wn.2d 572 (standard for reviewing sufficiency of evidence)
- State v. Salinas, 119 Wn.2d 192 (defendant admits truth of State’s evidence and reasonable inferences on sufficiency review)
- State v. Dana, 84 Wn. App. 166 (defines “lure” as an invitation accompanied by an enticement)
- State v. McReynolds, 142 Wn. App. 941 (contrast case where nonverbal signaling alone was held insufficient to prove attempt to get a minor into a vehicle)
- Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234 (affirmative defenses do not cure overbreadth concerns)
- Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601 (overbreadth doctrine standards; caution in facial invalidation)
- Virginia v. Hicks, 539 U.S. 113 (articulates burden and limits for overbreadth challenges)
- Members of City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789 (requires a realistic danger that a statute will significantly compromise recognized free speech)