State v. Holt
2011 MT 42
| Mont. | 2011Background
- Holt pled guilty to burglary under § 45-6-204, MCA, with a plea agreement for a ten-year sentence to run concurrently with a separate failure-to-register case.
- The State dismissed attempted sexual assault and a persistent felony offender designation; Holt admitted entering the residence with the intent to commit a misdemeanor assault by touching the victim.
- A psychosexual evaluation recommended Level III designation and mandatory sex offender treatment prior to parole eligibility; the district court deviated from the plea to impose that requirement.
- At sentencing in November 2009, the court designated Holt as a Level III sex offender and conditioned parole eligibility on completion of Phases I-II of sex offender treatment; Holt accepted the treatment condition.
- Holt challenged whether a district court could impose sex offender treatment as a parole-eligibility condition and whether Level III designation was proper, among other challenges.
- The Court affirmed the burglary sentence with respect to most issues but remanded solely to strike the Level III designation from the burglary sentence; a separate dissent attacked the treatment-condition ruling as unauthorized.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Authority to impose treatment as parole condition | Holt contends no statutory authority to condition parole eligibility on treatment. | State argues statutory authority under 46-18-201/202 allows such conditions. | Statutory authority for parole-conditioning treatment is lacking; remanded to strike Level III designation and treatment condition from burglary sentence. |
| Designation of Level III for burglary | Level III designation not authorized for burglary because burglary is not a sexual-offense under § 46-23-502. | Court relied on recommendations from psychosexual evaluation to designate Level III. | Level III designation unlawful for burglary; remand to strike this designation from the burglary sentence. |
| Relation to registration requirement | Challenge that the court improperly tied registration expectations to the burglary sentence. | Registration reference reflects statutory obligation and is at most a recommendation concerning parole. | References to registration were permissible as statutory statements and did not invalidate the burglary sentence. |
| Preservation of error on treatment condition | Holt preserved by asserting improper parole condition; lack of contemporaneous objection should not bar review. | Holt acquiesced and did not object at sentencing. | Court treated the issue as reviewable for legality; but the appeal outcome limited to striking the Level III designation and the treatment condition due to lack of statutory authority. |
| Parole-board exclusivity over parole matters | Judges may intrude on parole matters under general sentencing authority. | Parole decisions are exclusively within the parole board, with narrow statutory exceptions for judges. | Rules confirming parole matters are exclusive to the board; treating parole eligibility conditions as judge-imposed is improper. |
Key Cases Cited
- State v. Burch, 342 Mont. 499 (2008 MT 118) (no general authority to impose parole conditions without explicit statutory grant)
- State v. White, 349 Mont. 196 (2008 MT 464) (parole authority constrained by statute; no inherent sentencing power to parole)
- State v. Ashby, 342 Mont. 187 (2008 MT 83) (objecting to sentence conditions requires contemporaneous objection; illegality review possible)
- State v. Micklon, 314 Mont. 291 (2003 MT 45) (acquiescence in error does not validate illegal sentencing)
- In re Evert, 322 Mont. 105 (2004 MT 178) (prosecutor comments on upholding otherwise illegal resentencing are rejected)
- State v. Lenihan, 184 Mont. 338 (1979 MT 9) (sentencing authority exists only by statutory grant)
- Hernandez, 2009 MT 341 (2009 MT) (SRD exists for legal review of felonies; limits on appellate review of sentencing)