STATE OF MONTANA, Plаintiff and Appellee, v. DAVID REKO HERNANDEZ, Defendant and Appellant.
No. DA 08-0501.
Supreme Court of Montana
Decided October 20, 2009.
Rehearing Denied November 18, 2009.
2009 MT 341 | 353 Mont. 111 | 220 P.3d 25
Submitted on Briefs September 10, 2009.
JUSTICE NELSON dissented.
JUSTICE COTTER dissented, joined by JUSTICES NELSON and LEAPHART.
For Appellee: Hon. Steve Bullock, Montana Attorney General; Sheri K. Sprigg, Assistant Attorney General, Helena; Dеnnis Paxinos, Yellowstone County Attorney; Ann Marie McKittrick, Deputy County Attorney, Billings.
JUSTICE WARNER delivered the Opinion of the Court.
¶1 David Reko Hernandez was convicted in the Thirteenth Judicial District Court, Yellowstone County, of sexual assault on a child. He was sentenced to serve twenty-five years at Montana State Prison with the last ten years of the sentence suspended and was designated a Level III Offender and a Sexually Violent Predator. Hernandez appeals from the imposition of a condition on his suspended sentence which restricts his entering into some financial transactions.
¶2 In its sentencing order, over the objection of Hernandez, the District Court ordered, аs a condition of the suspension of the last ten years of his sentence, that:
The Defendant will obtain permission from his Probation & Parole Officer before financing or purchasing a vehicle, property, or engaging in business. The Defendant will not go into debt without his Probation & Parole Officer‘s permission. Restitution, child support, fines, and fees will be the Defendant‘s рriority financial obligations.
Hernandez appeals the District Court‘s imposition of this condition on his suspended sentence.
¶3 Generally, we review a criminal sentence for legality only; that is, whether the sentence falls within the statutory parameters. State v. Kotwicki, 2007 MT 17, ¶ 5, 335 Mont. 344, 151 P.3d 892. A sentencing judge may impose upon the offender reаsonable restrictions or conditions considered necessary for rehabilitation or for the protection of the victim or society.
¶4 The condition on Hernandez‘s suspended sentence at issue here
[A]dopt rules for the conduct of persons placed on parole or probation, except that the department may not make any rule conflicting with conditions of parole imposed by the board or conditions of probation imposed by a court.
¶5
The offender must obtain permission from his/her supervising officer before engaging in business, purchasing real property, purchasing аn automobile, or incurring a debt.
¶6 The condition on Hernandez‘s suspended sentence, that he obtain the permission of his supervising officer before engaging in certain financial transactions, is authorized by statute and rule. Thus, the Ashby requirement of a nexus to the offender or to the offense does not apрly. Ashby, ¶ 14-15.
¶7
¶8 Hernandez‘s only objection to the imposition of the condition in question was that it is not related to his offense. He offered nothing which indicated that such condition would impose a hardship on him. The sеntencing judge considered the facts that Hernandez‘s priority financial obligations while serving the suspended portion of his sentence would be restitution, child support, fines, and fees; that his probation officer could authorize any reasonable financial transaction; and that oversight was apprоpriate because his handling money and material possessions could cause Hernandez problems while on probation. Thus, the District Court declined to delete the condition of probation that Hernandez must obtain permission from his Probation
¶9 Affirmed.
CHIEF JUSTICE McGRATH, JUSTICES RICE and MORRIS concur.
CHIEF JUSTICE McGRATH specially concurs.
¶10 For the purposes of this opinion, I concur with the majority.
¶11 However, I believe that the authority to impose sentеnces for felony convictions lies within the exclusive power of the district courts. See
[The sentence review procedure] functions as an appellate prоcess because it is the only opportunity a criminal defendant has to challenge an otherwise lawful sentence on equitable grounds. See State v. Simtob (1969), 154 Mont. 286, 288, 462 P.2d 873, 874. In conducting its review, the Sentence Review Division functions as an arm of this Court.
Section 46-18-901, MCA . Were the legislature to abolish the review division, the function of reviewing sentencеs on equitable grounds would thus simply return to this Court. Additionally, like decisions issued directly by this Court, the decisions of the review division are final, cannot be appealed, and are reported in the Montana Reports.Section 46-18-905, MCA .
See also State v. Triplett, 2008 MT 360, ¶ 27, 346 Mont. 383, 195 P.3d 819.
¶12 The traditional standard of review of sentences by this Court was for legality only. State v. Montoya, 1999 MT 180, ¶ 15, 295 Mont. 288, 983 P.2d 937. In State v. Ommundson, 1999 MT 16, ¶ 11, 293 Mont. 133, 974 P.2d 620, overruled in part, State v. Herman, 2008 MT 187, ¶ 12, 343 Mont. 494, 188 P.3d 978 (overruling abuse of discrеtion standard of review outside of certain exceptions), this Court held that for a condition of sentence to be reasonable under
¶13 Conditions of probation are often designed to benefit the offender. Offenders do not have a constitutional right to a suspended sentence or probation. Rather, conditions of a sentence or probation are designed tо provide rehabilitation and protect the public.
¶14 A felony sentence necessarily involves consideration of a number of factors, most all of which are subjective.
¶15 All of these factors must bе considered by district courts in imposing a sentence. It is the district court that has direct access to the parties involved, the facts of the case, the victims, and the community impact. Moreover, it is the district court that can best determine, based on this information, a course of rehabilitation best suited fоr the individual offender. It is a difficult and demanding responsibility. Sentencing discretion by necessity must be very broad.
¶16 The Legislature has created the process to review sentences. Hernandez did not apply to the Sentence Review Division to review the conditions of his sentence, nor has he argued that his sentence is illegal. I would overrule Ommundson and dismiss this appeal for failure to follow proper procedure.
JUSTICE NELSON, dissenting.
¶17 I believe that under our current precedents, Justice Cotter‘s Dissent (¶¶ 23-27, infra) sets forth the correct analysis of the
¶18 As the Chief Justice notes, this Court held in State v. Montoya, 1999 MT 180, 295 Mont. 288, 983 P.2d 937, that we review criminal sentences for legality only. Montoya, ¶ 15. We modified that holding in State v. Herd, 2004 MT 85, 320 Mont. 490, 87 P.3d 1017, upon recognizing that the Sentence Review Division (SRD) has authority to review only those sentences which consist of a year or more of actual incarceration. Herd, ¶ 21 (citing
¶19 The problem is that we have no clear test for determining whether a condition of sentence is legal.1 This Court traditionally reviewed a sentencing condition for legality by determining whether the condition had “some correlation or cоnnection to the underlying offense for which the defendant is being sentenced.” State v. Ommundson, 1999 MT 16, ¶ 11, 293 Mont. 133, 974 P.2d 620. In other words, there had to be a “nexus” between the condition and the underlying offense. Ommundson, ¶ 12, modified, State v. Ashby, 2008 MT 83, ¶ 15, 342 Mont. 187, 179 P.3d 1164 (expanding Ommundson to include a nexus between the condition and the offender); see also e.g. Herd, ¶ 17; State v. Armstrong, 2006 MT 334, ¶ 11, 335 Mont. 131, 151 P.3d 46; State v. Greeson, 2007 MT 23, ¶ 12, 336 Mont. 1, 152 P.3d 695; State v. Marshall, 2007 MT 218, ¶ 20, 339 Mont. 50, 170 P.3d 923. Moreover, where necessary, we applied the abuse of discretion standard for determining whether the condition was excessive in terms of
¶20 But in State v. Stiles, 2008 MT 390, 347 Mont. 95, 197 P.3d 966, the Court interpreted Ashby as placing the nexus test under the abuse of discretion prong of our two-pronged stаndard of review, see Stiles, ¶ 13, though the Court did not articulate what test is to be used under the legality prong. Thus, we no longer have a test for reviewing a sentencing condition for legality. The “correlation or connection” test is what we presently use to determine whether the sentencing court abused its discretion. As а result, if we were to limit ourselves to reviewing felony sentences for legality only, as the Chief Justice suggests (Special Concurrence, ¶ 12), we effectively would conduct no review at all. In the present case, for instance, we would simply observe that the condition Hernandez challenges is “similar to” those we reviewed in Ashby and, as such, is legal. See Stiles, ¶ 14.
¶21 For these reasons, although the Chief Justice‘s arguments have some facial appeal, I conclude that until this Court articulates a sensible test for determining the legality of a sentencing condition, it is inadvisable to limit our review of conditions to legality only. Moreover, for the reasons articulated by Justice Cotter here (¶ 26, infra), and given my arguments in State v. Essig, 2009 MT 340, ¶¶ 39-46, 353 Mont. 99, 218 P.3d 838 (Nelson & Cotter, JJ., concurring in part and dissenting in part), I would not employ two different definitions of “abuse of discretion” when reviewing conditions of sentence.
¶22 I dissent.
JUSTICE COTTER dissents.
¶23 I dissent from several conclusions reached by the Court.
¶24 First, the Court states the condition at issue was imposed not under
¶25 Turning to Ashby, we have unfortunately injected confusion into our sentencing jurisprudence by defining an “abuse of discretion” in the context of imposing conditions of sentence as occurring “when a district court acts arbitrarily without the employment of conscientious judgment or exceeds the bounds of reason, in view of all the circumstances....” State v. Nelson, 2008 MT 359, ¶ 20, 346 Mont. 366, 195 P.3d 826, (quotation omitted).1 The Court perpetuates this confusion here by relying on State v. McLaughlin, 2009 MT 211, 351 Mont. 282, 210 P.3d 694, for the same proposition. Opinion, ¶ 7. Notably, McLaughlin is not even a sentencing case; rather, it addresses abuse of discretion in the context of the admissibility of evidence.
¶26 As we said in Ashby and in State v. Stiles, 2008 MT 390, 347 Mont. 95, 197 P.3d 966, a court abuses its discretion if it imposes a condition upon a sentence which lacks a nexus to either the offense or the offender. See Ashby, ¶ 9; Stiles, ¶ 13. In the interests of consistency and simplicity of application, we should use the nexus analysis in determining whether a court abuses its discretion in imposing a sentencing condition. Therefore, I disagree with the Court‘s reliance at ¶ 7 upon McLaughlin. Moreover, I would reverse Nelson to the limited extent that it endorses the wrong abuse of discretion standard for application in the context of reviewing sentencing conditions.
¶27 Finally, applying the nexus analysis to the condition at issue, I would conclude that the District Court abused its discretion in adopting the condition requiring the defendant to obtain permission from his Probation & Parole Officer before financing or purchasing
JUSTICES NELSON and LEAPHART join the Dissent of JUSTICE COTTER.