State v. Holt, 298 Kan. 469

Holt was convicted in 1994 of 60+ offenses, including two first-degree murders, with a life sentence plus 123–355 years.
On direct appeal, Holt I (1996) upheld his conviction and several claimed errors.
Holt pursued multiple postconviction avenues: four pro se 60-1507 motions, two 22-3504 motions, a reconsideration letter, a 2010-2012 22-3501 motion for new trial, and federal habeas petitions denied on appeal.
The district court summarily dismissed the 2010 22-3501 motion as untimely and/or successive; appellate history includes Holt II–Holt VI affirmances.
Holt’s August 2010 motion for a new trial was argued to be untimely and the court considered whether it could be treated as habeas relief; the court ultimately affirmed dismissal.
The Supreme Court of Kansas affirmed, holding the 14-year delay violated the statute and was untimely under both 22-3501(1) and 60-1507, and that the ineffective-assistance claim at the 1997 hearing was not preserved for appeal.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether 22-3501(1) time limit is mandatory.	Holt: limit is directory, not mandatory.	State: limit is mandatory.	Mandatory interpretation adopted.
Whether Holt’s motion could be treated as 60-1507 habeas.	Holt: should be treated as habeas relief.	State: untimely under 60-1507.	Untimely under 60-1507; procedurally barred.
Whether ineffective assistance at the 1997 hearing voids review.	Holt: raises for first time; tolling review.	State: not preserved.	Not considered on appeal.
Whether court abused its discretion in summary dismissal.	Untimely/successive claims warrant relief.	Dismissal appropriate.	Not abused; motion untimely.
Whether extension outside 14-day window was permissible.	Possible equitable extension.	Not allowed by statute.	No extension permitted under statute.

Bradley v. State, 246 Kan. 316, 787 P.2d 706 (1990) (interpretation of 22-3501(1) time limits; ‘shall be made’ read as mandatory (2-year/10-day limits).)
Raschke v. State, 289 Kan. 911, 219 P.3d 481 (2009) (four Raschke factors for mandatory vs. directory analysis.)
Bradley (Bradley v. State) (quoted above), 246 Kan. 316, 787 P.2d 706 (1990) (same source noted for background on timing interpretation.)
State v. McCoin, 278 Kan. 465, 101 P.3d 1204 (2004) (arrest of judgment timing; supports finite deadlines.)
State v. Moses, 296 Kan. 1126, 297 P.3d 1174 (2013) (withdrawal of plea timing; demonstrates strict deadlines.)
State v. McDaniel, 292 Kan. 443, 254 P.3d 534 (2011) (directory vs mandatory timing; Raschke framework.)
State v. Andrews, 228 Kan. 368, 614 P.2d 447 (1980) (early interpretation of timing for postconviction motions.)
State v. Deavers, 252 Kan. 149, 843 P.2d 695 (1992) (general rule on when procedural provisions are mandatory vs directory.)
State v. Ward, 292 Kan. 541, 256 P.3d 801 (2011) (standard of review for abuse of discretion in criminal cases.)
Gibbons v. State, 256 Kan. 951, 889 P.2d 772 (1995) (jurisdictional issues after docketing of appeal.)