State v. Holloway, 916 N.W.2d 338

Background

In Dec. 2014, Christopher Holloway (44) engaged in sexual acts with J.D., a 14-year-old; Holloway claimed J.D. told him he was 18; J.D. testified he told Holloway he was 14.
Holloway was charged with third- and fourth-degree criminal sexual conduct under Minn. Stat. §§ 609.344(1)(b) and 609.345(1)(b) for sex with a person age 13–15 when the actor is a specified number of months older.
The statutes permit a mistake-of-age affirmative defense only when the actor is no more than 120 months older than the complainant; otherwise mistake as to age is not a defense.
Holloway (≈30 years older) moved to declare the 120‑month limitation unconstitutional on substantive due process and equal protection grounds and argued the statutes imposed strict liability; the district court denied relief and a jury convicted him.
The court of appeals affirmed; the Minnesota Supreme Court granted review and affirmed the conviction.

Issues

Issue	Holloway's Argument	State's Argument	Held
Whether the statutes violate substantive due process by precluding mistake-of-age for actors >120 months older	Denial of mistake‑of‑age defense infringes fundamental right to a fair trial and to present a complete defense, warranting strict scrutiny	No fundamental right implicated; statutes rationally protect children so only rational‑basis review applies	No fundamental right; rational‑basis applies; statutes reasonably further protecting minors and are constitutional
Whether the statutes violate equal protection by treating similarly situated defendants differently based on age gap	Classification arbitrary: some defendants may assert mistake‑of‑age while others (like Holloway) cannot	Age is not a suspect class; classification is rationally related to legitimate state interest (protecting children)	Classification satisfies Minnesota's more exacting rational‑basis test (three-part inquiry); no equal protection violation
Whether the statutes impose strict liability for complainant's age	Statutes effectively create strict liability by disallowing mistake‑of‑age defense for many defendants	Statutes require only general intent to engage in sexual penetration/contact, not knowledge of age; not strict liability	Not strict liability; mens rea attaches to the sexual act (general intent), following State v. Wenthe
Whether exclusion of mistake‑of‑age defense infringes right to present a defense / jury-instruction error	Excluding the defense (and alleged instruction omission) violated right to present a complete defense and merits reversal	Mistake‑of‑age is not an element the State must prove; exclusion does not impair fundamental defense right; jury instructions properly stated intent	Right to present defense not implicated because defendant need not rebut an element; instructions adequate; no reversible error

Key Cases Cited

State v. Wenthe, 865 N.W.2d 293 (Minn. 2015) (mens rea for CSC generally attaches to the sexual act, not attendant circumstances)
State v. Muccio, 890 N.W.2d 914 (Minn. 2017) (recognizing protecting children from sexual abuse as a legitimate legislative objective)
Boutin v. LaFleur, 591 N.W.2d 711 (Minn. 1999) (substantive due process forbids certain arbitrary government actions)
State v. Rey, 905 N.W.2d 490 (Minn. 2018) (standard of review for substantive due process challenges)
Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997) (framework for identifying fundamental rights)
Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937) (discussion of rights implicit in ordered liberty)
United States v. Malloy, 568 F.3d 166 (4th Cir. 2009) (upholding prohibition on mistake‑of‑age defense; government interest in protecting children)
New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982) (government’s strong interest in preventing sexual exploitation of children)
United States v. Ransom, 942 F.2d 775 (10th Cir. 1991) (historical treatment of statutory rape as an exception to intent requirement)
Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246 (1952) (recognition that some offenses historically do not require proof of criminal intent)