State v. Hirschfelder, 170 Wash. 2d 536

Hirschfelder, a 33-year-old choir teacher at Hoquiam High School, had sexual intercourse with A.N.T., an 18-year-old registered student, in 2006.
He was charged with sexual misconduct with a minor in the first degree under former RCW 9A.44.093(l)(b).
The statute makes guilt hinge on a school employee having sexual intercourse with a registered student who is at least sixteen and not married, if the employee is at least sixty months older.
The Court of Appeals reversed, concluding the statute was ambiguous and that the legislature intended to criminalize only 16- and 17-year-old students.
This Court granted review to determine the plain meaning of 'minor' in the statute and to address vagueness and equal protection challenges.
The majority holds that 'minor' includes registered students from age 16 up to 21; the statute is not vague and does not violate equal protection.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Does former RCW 9A.44.093(l)(b) include 18–21-year-old registered students as 'minors'?	Hirschfelder argues 18+ excludes, making the statute ambiguous.	State argues 'minor' is defined by the statute’s victim class, including up to 21.	Yes; 'minor' includes 16–21-year-old registered students.
Is former RCW 9A.44.093(l)(b) unconstitutionally vague?	Hirschfelder contends vague terms render notice inadequate.	State contends the statute provides adequate notice of prohibited conduct.	No; not vague.
Does the statute violate equal protection by restricting to K–12 school employees?	Hirschfelder asserts non-K–12 employees interacting with students are treated differently.	State defends rational basis, arguing legitimate interest in protecting students in supervised settings.	No; rational basis; no equal protection violation.
Does RCW 9A.44.030(3)(d) affirmative defense affect the interpretation of the statute?	Majority ignores defense provision that could negate the charged conduct.	State argues defense is inapplicable to the plain meaning of (l)(b).	Defense does not change the plain meaning; does not alter interpretation here.

State v. Campbell & Gwinn, 146 Wn.2d 1 (2002) (statutory plain meaning and de novo review)
State v. J.P., 149 Wn.2d 444 (2003) (interpretation principles; plain meaning and harmonization)
City of Tacoma v. Luvene, 118 Wn.2d 826 (1992) (statutory clarity and notice requirements)
Hallauer v. Spectrum Props., Inc., 143 Wn.2d 126 (2001) (when statutes relate to same subject, specific vs general controls)
Andersen v. King County, 158 Wn.2d 1 (2006) (equal protection framework and rational basis review)
State v. Clinkenbeard, 130 Wn. App. 552 (2005) (expert discussion on rational basis and governmental purposes)
State v. Glas, 147 Wn.2d 410 (2002) (void-for-vagueness standard)
State v. Smith, 93 Wn.2d 329 (1980) (rational basis review framework)