286 A.3d 38
Md. Ct. Spec. App.2022Background
- Henry, Jackson, and Powell were indicted on related charges and agreed to consolidated trials; counsel entered appearances in April 2021.
- COVID-era tolling made the 180‑day Hicks deadline uncertain; the parties and court believed jury trials resumed April 26, 2021, making the Hicks date October 25, 2021.
- At a June 4, 2021 status conference the court set trial for October 26, 2021 (one day after Hicks). Henry’s counsel expressly agreed to that date; Jackson later—when present—acknowledged the October 26 date on the record; Powell and his counsel silently acquiesced.
- On October 26 the State sought a short postponement for good cause; defendants moved to dismiss for a Hicks violation.
- The motions court dismissed all three indictments with prejudice. The State appealed.
- The Court of Special Appeals reversed dismissal for Henry and Jackson (found express consent) and affirmed dismissal for Powell (silence/implied consent insufficient).
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (State) | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether express consent to a trial date outside the 180‑day Hicks period avoids mandatory dismissal even if the consenting party was unaware the date exceeded 180 days | Lattisaw permits dismissal to be avoided when defendant or counsel expressly agrees to a specific post‑Hicks date, even without knowledge that it exceeds 180 days | Defendant (Henry) argued express consent must be knowing and voluntary (i.e., aware the date exceeded Hicks) | Held: Express agreement to a date certain suffices; lack of knowledge that the date exceeded 180 days does not require dismissal (reversed as to Henry) |
| Whether a defendant’s on‑the‑record acknowledgment of the scheduled date constitutes express consent | State: a defendant’s own affirmative acknowledgment on the record constitutes express consent to the date | Jackson (through counsel) disputed earlier counsel agreement, but Jackson herself confirmed the dates on the record | Held: Jackson’s on‑the‑record confirmation (“Twenty sixth, okay”) was express consent; dismissal reversed |
| Whether silence or implied acquiescence constitutes express consent to a post‑Hicks trial date | State: defendant’s presence, rejection of earlier dates, consolidation, and silent acquiescence show he became a party to the agreed date | Powell: silence and acquiescence do not equal express consent; waiver requires an affirmative expression | Held: Implied or tacit consent is insufficient; express (clear, unmistakable) consent required; dismissal affirmed for Powell |
Key Cases Cited
- State v. Hicks, 285 Md. 310 (1979) (mandates dismissal for violation of statutory 180‑day trial deadline but excepts situations where the defendant or counsel seeks or expressly consents to a post‑Hicks date)
- State v. Lattisaw, 48 Md. App. 20 (1981) (defense counsel’s agreement to a date beyond Hicks constitutes express consent even if counsel did not know the date exceeded 180 days)
- Goins v. State, 293 Md. 97 (1982) (rejects treating implied consent or dilatory conduct as the equivalent of express consent under Hicks)
- Dorsey v. State, 349 Md. 688 (1998) (whether a defendant sought a post‑Hicks date is a fact‑specific inquiry; State bears burden to show an exception to dismissal)
- Tunnell v. State, 466 Md. 565 (2020) (discusses public‑policy balance underlying Hicks and recognizes defendant may validly consent to postponement to permit resolution on the merits)
- Pennington v. State, 299 Md. 23 (1984) (postponement requested by defendant late in the Hicks period that results in a post‑Hicks date can qualify as the defendant seeking a post‑Hicks trial date)