State v. Heinz (Slip Opinion), 146 Ohio St. 3d 374

Background

Defendant Joseph Heinz was sentenced to 24 months community control after pleading guilty to attempted abduction; prior positive drug tests led to extensions of community control.
The trial judge entered a standing order directing that the county probation department — not the county prosecutor — would represent the state in all community-control-violation proceedings and barring prosecutor participation absent leave.
After a diluted urine test in September 2014, a revocation hearing was held; the prosecutor attempted to speak but was denied because he had not filed the pre-hearing Request for Leave.
The trial court found a violation and imposed 14 days in jail; the court of appeals affirmed, reasoning probation officers adequately represented the state and community-control hearings are informal.
The State appealed to the Ohio Supreme Court arguing (1) the state is a party to community-control-violation proceedings, (2) R.C. 309.08 gives the prosecuting attorney authority to represent the state in such proceedings, and (3) the standing order unlawfully supplanted the prosecutor’s role.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (State)	Defendant's Argument (Heinz)	Held
Whether the state is a party to community-control-violation proceedings and the prosecutor must be given notice and an opportunity to be heard	R.C. 309.08 makes the prosecutor the state’s legal representative in any proceeding where the state is a party, including community-control violations	Community-control revocation hearings are informal (like parole/probation revocations); historically probation officers represent the state and statutes do not require prosecutor participation	The state is a party; the prosecutor represents the state and is entitled to notice and an opportunity to be heard
Whether probation officers may represent the state at violation hearings	Probation officers may report violations but lack statutory authority to prosecute or represent the state; most are not lawyers and cannot protect appellate rights	Practical tradition supports probation officers’ representation; requiring prosecutors at every hearing would formalize proceedings	Probation officers cannot legally represent the state; prosecutor must be afforded opportunity to participate
Whether the trial court’s standing order barring prosecutor participation absent leave was lawful	Standing order unlawfully deprived the prosecutor of his statutory role and hindered appellate preservation	The order was within the court’s discretion and not an abuse because participation would be cumulative	The standing order was erroneous; prosecutor must receive notice and opportunity to be heard
Whether Gagnon v. Scarpelli controls and permits excluding prosecutors from revocation proceedings	Gagnon distinguished probation revocations from criminal prosecutions, but community control is different: it is a sentencing proceeding with adversarial features	Gagnon supports the informality of revocation hearings and traditionally non-prosecutorial representation	Gagnon does not control; community-control revocations are formal, adversarial sentencing proceedings requiring state representation by the prosecutor

Key Cases Cited

Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778 (1973) (probation revocation not a stage of criminal prosecution; parole officer traditionally represents the state in revocation hearings)
Wright v. Schick, 134 Ohio St. 193 (1938) (definition of "parties" includes those with rights to control proceedings, present evidence, cross-examine, and appeal)
State v. Fraley, 105 Ohio St.3d 13 (2004) (after a community-control violation the court conducts a second sentencing and must comply with sentencing statutes)
State v. Talty, 103 Ohio St.3d 177 (2004) (community control replaced probation under Ohio’s felony sentencing law)
State v. Anderson, 143 Ohio St.3d 173 (2015) (probation described as a grant of grace with continued court supervision)