State v. Heimberger, 2018 Ohio 3001

On April 14, 2017, Heimberger was stopped after a 911 caller (an identified citizen) reported a U-Haul van driving erratically; trooper observed the van cross the center line and initiated a stop.
Trooper Overly observed signs (droopy eyelids, slowed/slurred speech, constricted pupils) and administered field sobriety tests; Heimberger admitted taking medications including Prozac, Xanax, and Tramadol.
Heimberger was charged with OVI under R.C. 4511.19(A)(1)(a) and a marked lanes violation; the marked lanes count was later dismissed and she was convicted of OVI by a jury.
Pretrial, Heimberger moved to suppress the stop, the field sobriety evidence, and her statements; the trial court denied suppression, finding reasonable suspicion and that she was not in custody when questioned.
Heimberger sought to admit testimony from her counselor about a panic disorder; the trial court excluded the testimony as (1) underdeveloped for expert opinion and (2) not based on first-hand observation for lay testimony.
Heimberger appealed, raising five assignments of error (exclusion of counselor testimony, validity of the stop, Miranda/custody, and manifest weight of the evidence); the appellate court affirmed.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Validity of traffic stop (reasonable suspicion)	Trooper had reasonable suspicion based on 911 informant and his observations	Stop lacked lawful basis; citizen caller unreliable	Stop was supported by totality: identified citizen tip + trooper’s observation; reasonable suspicion upheld
Custody/Miranda for medication questions	Trooper’s questions were noncustodial during investigative stop; later Miranda given	Statements about medications were product of custodial interrogation and should be suppressed	Placement in cruiser was for safety, not custody; statements admissible; later voluntary statements after Miranda also admissible
Exclusion of counselor’s expert testimony	Counselor’s testimony was irrelevant/underdeveloped and not a proper expert opinion	Counselor should have been admitted (expert or lay) to explain panic disorder effect on driving	Trial court acted within discretion: proffer was underdeveloped for expert; counselor lacked first‑hand observation for lay opinion; exclusion proper
Manifest weight of evidence for OVI conviction	State presented credible eyewitness and officer testimony plus admissions and SFST observations	Evidence was insufficient/informant prone to exaggeration; meds explained impairment	Record contained competent, credible evidence (informant, trooper observations, admissions, SFST signs); conviction not against manifest weight

Burnside v. Ohio, 100 Ohio St.3d 152 (2003) (standard for reviewing mixed questions of law and fact on suppression)
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) (stop must be justified by specific and articulable facts)
Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420 (1984) (routine traffic stop questioning not custodial for Miranda purposes unless treatment renders person in custody)
Maumee v. Weisner, 87 Ohio St.3d 295 (1999) (assessing reliability of informant tips: veracity, reliability, and basis of knowledge)
State v. Farris, 109 Ohio St.3d 519 (2006) (post-stop treatment can create custody requiring Miranda)
Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983) (totality-of-the-circumstances test for informant tips)
State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380 (1997) (standards for manifest-weight review)
Seasons Coal Co. v. Cleveland, 10 Ohio St.3d 77 (1984) (trial court’s advantage on witness credibility)
State v. Kovac, 150 Ohio App.3d 676 (2002) (lay testimony on demeanor/emotional state must be based on firsthand perception)