State v. Hartman (Slip Opinion)
2020 Ohio 4440
Ohio2020Background
- In October 2015 E.W. alleged Mitchell Hartman raped her in a hotel room; Hartman claimed the encounter was consensual.
- The state introduced "other-acts" evidence: testimony from B.T., Hartman’s former stepdaughter, describing sexual abuse when she was a child in 2012.
- The trial court admitted B.T.’s testimony under Evid.R. 404(B) as probative of motive, intent, plan/scheme, absence of mistake, modus operandi, and identity; the jury convicted Hartman of two rape counts and found him a sexually violent predator.
- The Eighth District Court of Appeals reversed, holding the other-acts evidence was improperly admitted (primarily because identity was not at issue and the evidence amounted to forbidden propensity evidence) and found cumulative error.
- The Ohio Supreme Court accepted the state's appeal on a broad legal proposition (that other-acts evidence may prove intent/plan even when identity is not disputed), but affirmed the court of appeals: the specific child‑molestation evidence was not probative of any permissible non‑propensity purpose and was improperly admitted; boilerplate limiting instructions did not cure the prejudice.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether other-acts evidence may be admitted under Evid.R. 404(B) for non‑propensity purposes when identity is not disputed | State: Yes — other-acts can prove intent, plan, or absence of mistake even if identity is conceded | Hartman: Admission would be impermissible character/propensity evidence | Court: Legal rule allows non‑propensity uses, but admissibility depends on relevance to a specific contested issue and the absence of intermediate propensity inferences |
| Whether B.T.’s abuse showed modus operandi or identity | State: Similarity (victims asleep) shows a behavioral fingerprint identifying Hartman | Hartman: Incidents are common and not uniquely distinctive; identity was not contested | Held: No — similarities were not sufficiently distinctive and identity was not in dispute, so modus operandi rationale fails |
| Whether the prior acts showed a common scheme or plan connected to the charged rape | State: The prior abuse reflects a plan targeting sleeping victims | Hartman: The acts were separate, dissimilar events with no larger design | Held: No — plan evidence must show the charged crime and other acts are part of a larger, connected design; that link was absent |
| Whether the prior molestation established motive for raping E.W. | State: Prior conduct shows motive to target sleeping/impaired victims | Hartman: Motive for sexual assault (sexual gratification) is self‑evident; prior acts add nothing | Held: No — the prior acts do not show a distinct, material motive beyond ordinary sexual gratification |
| Whether B.T.’s testimony was admissible to rebut Hartman’s consent defense (intent/absence of mistake) | State: Prior acts make an innocent mistake (belief in consent) implausible and negate mistake | Hartman: Prior child abuse is too dissimilar and invites improper propensity inference | Held: No — the temporal/modal/circumstantial relationship was insufficient to negate the consent defense without impermissibly relying on propensity |
| Whether limiting instructions cured any prejudice from the other-acts testimony | State: Multiple cautionary instructions limited jury use | Hartman: Prejudice intrinsic; instructions insufficient | Held: Boilerplate instructions were inadequate; a narrowly tailored, case‑specific limiting instruction is required and would not have cured the prejudice here |
Key Cases Cited
- State v. Curry, 43 Ohio St.2d 66 (discusses prohibition on propensity evidence)
- State v. Hector, 19 Ohio St.2d 167 (on juror tendency to rely on similar‑acts proof)
- State v. Williams, 134 Ohio St.3d 521 (other‑acts admissibility requires relevance to a material disputed issue; plan evidence may be admissible even when identity is not contested)
- Huddleston v. United States, 485 U.S. 681 (similar‑act evidence must have sufficient proof that the act occurred and was committed by defendant)
- United States v. Gomez, 763 F.3d 845 (importance of scrutinizing chain of reasoning to avoid propensity inferences)
- State v. Gardner, 59 Ohio St.2d 14 (prior‑act evidence closely related in time/place can be probative of intent to rebut consent)
- State v. Burson, 38 Ohio St.2d 157 (framework for when prior acts disclose purposeful action related to charged offense)
- State v. Schaim, 65 Ohio St.3d 51 (discussion of tactical decisions regarding limiting instructions)