State v. Harris, 296 Neb. 317

Background

In 1999 Jack E. Harris was convicted of first‑degree murder and related weapon charges for the 1995 killing of Anthony Jones; co‑defendant Howard “Homicide” Hicks testified against him. Harris exhausted direct appeal and multiple postconviction proceedings.
Harris later discovered affidavits (from Terrell McClinton and Curtis Allgood) alleging Hicks admitted he acted alone and placing Hicks near the scene; these led to successive postconviction motions and evidentiary hearings (most recently in 2013).
Evidence showed a police supplemental file was faxed to the prosecutor in July 1999 that included 29 pages; the prosecutor later endorsed Officer Agnew and Allgood as potential witnesses but stated she did not call Allgood at trial. Defense counsel testified he did not have Allgood reports and would have investigated further had he known the content.
The district court denied relief in 2016, finding (a) no Brady violation as to McClinton (whose information arose after conviction) and (b) no suppression as to Allgood because the prosecutor allegedly lacked knowledge of Allgood’s exculpatory statements; the court did not rule on Harris’ claim regarding the prosecutor’s representations about Hicks’ plea agreement.
The Nebraska Supreme Court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded: it upheld denial as to McClinton but held the district court applied incorrect standards regarding Allgood and failed to address claims about Hicks’ plea agreement and the scope of the motion(s) decided.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether Brady duty extends to evidence learned by State after conviction (McClinton)	Harris: State must disclose exculpatory evidence learned postconviction or Nebraska procedures are inadequate	State: Brady does not apply post‑conviction; postconviction/new‑trial statutes and ethics govern	Court: Brady does not apply to evidence the State first learned after a fair trial and conviction (Osborne governs); denial affirmed
Whether State suppressed Allgood’s pretrial statements to police (Brady)	Harris: Allgood told police in 1996–97 that Hicks was at his house the night of the murder; prosecutor’s endorsement shows knowledge; statements would have impeached Hicks and aided alibi, so nondisclosure was material	State: Allgood’s limited statements were not exculpatory/impeaching such that disclosure mattered; prosecutor lacked actual knowledge of content	Court: District court used wrong standard (focused only on prosecutor’s personal knowledge and did not assess impeachment value/materiality or cumulative effect); remanded for proper Brady analysis
Whether prosecutor misrepresented or allowed misrepresentation of Hicks’ plea agreement	Harris: Prosecutor misrepresented plea terms and failed to disclose impeachment evidence about the actual agreement	State: Procedural objections noted; record ambiguous whether claim was before trial court	Held: District court failed to rule on this claim; remand required to clarify and decide claim consistent with standards (including cumulative materiality)
Ineffective assistance for failure to call Allgood/McClinton	Harris: If counsel knew of their statements, failure to investigate/call them was deficient and prejudicial	State: Trial counsel did not know of the evidence; additional ineffective‑assistance claims not raised timely are procedurally barred	Court: Finding that counsel lacked knowledge was not clearly erroneous; a new ineffective‑assistance theory that was available earlier but not raised is procedurally barred

Key Cases Cited

Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (prosecution must disclose favorable evidence to defendant)
United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667 (materiality standard: reasonable probability result would differ)
Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419 (cumulative assessment of suppressed evidence; undermines confidence in verdict)
Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263 (Brady components: favorable, suppressed, prejudice)
District Attorney’s Office for Third Judicial Dist. v. Osborne, 557 U.S. 52 (Brady does not extend to postconviction disclosure of evidence the State first learns of after a fair trial)
Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409 (prosecutorial duties at trial differ from posttrial ethical duties)