State v. Harris
1108002195
| Del. Super. Ct. | Apr 26, 2017Background
- Earl Harris was indicted in Delaware on capital-related charges in 2012 while serving a New Jersey sentence; Delaware lodged a detainer in April 2013.
- The State returned Harris to Delaware on November 14, 2014 via a Governor's Warrant; counsel was assigned December 5, 2014.
- At a March 2, 2015 office conference (within 120 days of arrival), parties discussed scheduling and defense counsel agreed to an October 2016 trial date (well beyond 120 days).
- The State initially told the court it did not use the UAD for capital cases and that Governor’s Warrants did not trigger the UAD; later (citing Mauro) it acknowledged the UAD might apply.
- Harris moved to dismiss under the Uniform Agreement on Detainers (UAD) / IAD 120‑day provision; the trial court considered Mauro but ultimately found Harris waived the UAD time limit by agreeing to the later trial date.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (State) | Defendant's Argument (Harris) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Does the UAD 120‑day trial limit apply when the State returns a prisoner via Governor's Warrant or in capital cases? | Governor's Warrant is distinct and does not trigger §2543; UAD not used for capital returns. | Mauro and UAD principles mean written requests or custody-creating instruments (including Governor's Warrant) trigger UAD timing. | Court did not decide this question on the merits because of waiver; noted Mauro may apply but left it unresolved. |
| Does United States v. Mauro require treating a writ or equivalent custody instrument as a "written request" under the IAD/UAD? | State initially argued Mauro inapplicable to Governor's Warrant; later acknowledged Mauro might apply. | Harris relied on Mauro to argue the Governor's Warrant functionally triggered the UAD. | Court recognized Mauro’s reasoning could extend to instruments that obtain custody, but did not resolve applicability here due to waiver. |
| Can a defendant (through counsel) waive UAD timing by agreeing to a trial date beyond 120 days? | The State argued Harris waived the UAD time limit by consenting to the October 2016 date. | Harris contended he never waived and the State failed to try within 120 days. | Held: Voluntary waiver by counsel is sufficient; Harris (through counsel) freely acquiesced to the later trial date, so waiver bars dismissal. |
| If UAD applied and was not waived, would dismissal be required absent good cause? | If applicable, the State could argue good cause or tolling; otherwise UAD mandates dismissal. | Harris argued no waiver, no continuance within 120 days, and no valid tolling, so dismissal required. | Court noted UAD requires dismissal if time violated and no proper continuance/tolling, but did not reach this remedy because waiver controlled the outcome. |
Key Cases Cited
- United States v. Mauro, 436 U.S. 340 (1978) (writ used to obtain custody can constitute a "written request" under the IAD, triggering timing obligations)
- New York v. Hill, 528 U.S. 110 (2000) (defendant may waive IAD/UAD timing by counsel agreeing to trial date outside statutory period)
- Rauf v. State, 145 A.3d 430 (Del. 2016) (Delaware Supreme Court decision prompting the State to abandon pursuit of death penalty in related cases)
- State v. Slaughter, 152 A.3d 1275 (Del. Super. 2017) (statutory UAD waivers need only be voluntary, not necessarily knowing and intelligent)
- Bruce v. State, 781 A.2d 544 (Del. 2001) (discusses tolling and procedural aspects of Delaware’s UAD)