509 P.3d 83
Or.2022Background
- Victim RBH was shot early Sept 20, 2017; officers recovered two cell phones from his body and obtained records for one phone that showed nine calls from number “-2494” between 3:13–3:21 a.m.
- Police obtained a Sept. 22, 2017 T‑Mobile search warrant for number -2494 that sought extensive data (60 hours of CDRs, message contents, location/GPS, web/data usage).
- Records from that warrant were later linked to Harris and were used to obtain 20+ additional search warrants (phones, online accounts) and multiple wiretap orders.
- The wiretap applications were submitted by a deputy district attorney who stated he was authorized by the elected Washington County DA, but the applications did not state the DA personally reviewed or approved them.
- Harris moved to suppress evidence from the wiretaps and the cell‑phone warrants; the trial court granted suppression of the wiretap evidence and suppressed records obtained via the Sept. 22 warrant and the later warrants (after excising tainted evidence).
- The Oregon Supreme Court affirmed: (1) wiretap evidence suppressed because federal law requires the principal prosecuting attorney’s personal role in authorization; (2) the Sept. 22 warrant was overbroad and, with tainted info removed, subsequent warrants lacked probable cause.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (State) | Defendant's Argument (Harris) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether 18 U.S.C. § 2516(2) permits delegation of wiretap‑application authority to deputies | Federal statute does not preclude state law delegation; silence allows delegation and "substantial compliance" suffices | § 2516(2) limits applicants to the "principal prosecuting attorney;" delegation without DA’s personal review/approval violates federal law | Court: § 2516(2) requires centralization; delegation that does not show DA’s personal authorization is not permitted; applications by deputy were unauthorized |
| Whether wiretap evidence should be admitted under a good‑faith exception | Even if procedural defect, officers acted in good faith relying on issued wiretap orders, so suppression is unnecessary | Wiretap Act contains its own, mandatory suppression provisions; good‑faith exception to Fourth Amendment exclusion does not override statutory suppression | Court: Suppression required under 18 U.S.C. §§ 2515 and 2518(10)(a)(i); no good‑faith rescue where statutory authorization was a core Congressional concern |
| Whether the Sept. 22, 2017 T‑Mobile warrant was supported by probable cause and sufficiently particular (overbreadth) | Warrant was reasonably tailored to identify the caller and relevant activity; probable cause supported broader data collection | Affidavit only supported identifying the caller; requesting 60 hours of full content, location and web/data logs was overbroad and not justified | Court: Warrant was overbroad under Or. Const. art. I, § 9; suppression of material obtained was appropriate |
| Whether later warrants remain valid after excising evidence derived from the Sept. 22 warrant | Later warrants independently established probable cause and were sufficiently particular | Later warrants relied on tainted evidence; once excised, affidavits lack probable cause | Court: After striking evidence obtained from the invalid Sept. 22 warrant, the later warrants did not establish probable cause and were properly suppressed |
Key Cases Cited
- United States v. Giordano, 416 U.S. 505 (1974) (Congress intended to confine wiretap‑application authority to specified high‑level officials and to centralize responsibility)
- United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984) (articulated the Fourth Amendment "good faith" exception to exclusionary rule for defective search warrants)
- Dahda v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 1491 (2018) (reiterated that statutory violations of Title III addressing core concerns require suppression)
- Villa v. Maricopa Cty., 865 F.3d 1224 (9th Cir. 2017) (discussed "substantial compliance" analyses and limits on delegation in wiretap contexts)
- State v. Mansor, 363 Or. 185 (2018) (explained Oregon art. I, § 9 privacy framework and particularity/overbreadth considerations)
- State v. Foster, 350 Or. 161 (2011) (probable cause standard for warrants under Or. Const. art. I, § 9)