State v. Hansford, 923 N.W.2d 113

In Jan. 2017 Samuel Hansford (24) was investigated for allegedly having sexual intercourse with a 16‑year‑old; an agent went to Hansford’s workplace and offered to interview him at the police station; Hansford accepted a ride in an unmarked car and was not restrained.
At the station the agent read Miranda warnings (initially a “soft” version, then line‑by‑line); Hansford acknowledged understanding and the interview began (audio/video recorded).
After ~40 minutes Hansford said he wanted an attorney; the agent left the room and returned; Hansford twice tried to call counsel from a phone book and ultimately signed a written waiver (Voluntary Statement Form) and made incriminating statements.
Hansford moved to suppress, arguing the waiver and statements were coerced (due process and Miranda violations) and that his Sixth Amendment right to counsel was denied; a suppression hearing with testimony and recordings was held.
The district court found Hansford was not in custody for Miranda purposes, that he understood he was free to leave, that he rescinded his request for counsel voluntarily, and denied suppression; Hansford was convicted by a jury and appealed.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (State)	Defendant's Argument (Hansford)	Held
Whether Hansford was "in custody" for Miranda purposes	Not custody: he rode unrestrained, was told he could leave, sat by the door, interviewed by one agent	He was effectively restrained (no ride, pressured) so Miranda invoked when he asked for counsel	Not custody; a reasonable person would have felt free to leave; Miranda not required
Whether Hansford validly invoked and then rescinded his right to counsel	Even if asked, Hansford voluntarily waived after opportunities to contact counsel; waiver was knowing and voluntary	Initial request for an attorney was clear and interrogation should have ceased; subsequent waiver was coerced	Waiver was voluntary; rescission was real and not the product of coercion
Whether statements were voluntary (due process/Fifth Amendment)	Statements were the product of free choice given warnings, opportunity to call counsel, and setting	Statements were coerced by agent’s conduct, Hansford’s inexperience, and lack of transportation	Statements were voluntary under the totality of circumstances; suppression denied
Whether the Sixth Amendment right to counsel was violated	(State did not separately argue)	Interrogation after right to counsel attached (post‑arraignment) violated Sixth Amendment	Issue not addressed on merits—Hansford failed to brief persuasive analysis; court declined to consider it

State v. Knox, 873 N.W.2d 664 (N.D. 2016) (standard of review for suppression findings)
State v. Webster, 834 N.W.2d 283 (N.D. 2013) (Miranda custodial‑interrogation framework)
State v. Goebel, 725 N.W.2d 578 (N.D. 2007) (two‑part voluntariness/totality‑of‑circumstances test)
State v. Taillon, 470 N.W.2d 226 (N.D. 1991) (Miranda warnings and voluntariness considerations)
Montejo v. Louisiana, 556 U.S. 778 (U.S. 2009) (Sixth Amendment right to counsel at critical stages)
Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 (U.S. 1964) (right to counsel after initiation of adversary proceedings)
State v. Brickle‑Hicks, 916 N.W.2d 781 (N.D. 2018) (voluntariness standard and Miranda waiver analysis)
United States v. Bautista, 145 F.3d 1140 (10th Cir. 1998) (gratuitous Miranda warnings factor into voluntariness)
Bormann v. AT&T Commc'ns, Inc., 875 F.2d 399 (2d Cir. 1989) (district court’s consideration of totality of circumstances suffices even if not labeled)