State v. Hanna, 305 Ga. 100

Defendant Tina Marie Hanna (I.Q. 58) pled guilty to two counts of felony murder and two counts of first-degree cruelty to children for the death of her infant son, Mombera, who died of starvation after premature discharge from hospital.
Prosecutor and defense counsel stipulated a factual basis; defense emphasized intellectual disability and mitigation facts.
At sentencing the trial court entered judgment for felony murder but, invoking the rule of lenity, imposed the penalty for the distinct statutory offense of "contributing to the deprivation of a minor leading to death" (former OCGA § 16-12-1), a lesser sentence (10 years, with four to serve in confinement).
The State objected that the court could not impose a sentence for an uncharged offense and that felony murder carries only death or life imprisonment.
The Supreme Court of Georgia held the sentence void because the court sentenced Hanna for an offense she was not convicted of; vacated that sentence and remanded for further proceedings.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether the trial court lawfully applied the rule of lenity to impose a lesser sentence for an offense not charged	State: court cannot sentence for an uncharged offense; felony murder punishment is fixed (death or life)	Hanna: overlapping statutes criminalize same conduct so rule of lenity entitles her to lesser penalty	Court: sentence void — court may not impose sentence for a different, uncharged offense; vacated and remanded
Whether the rule of lenity required recharacterizing felony murder conviction into the lesser deprivation statute	State: rule of lenity applies only to resolve statutory ambiguity, not to substitute a different conviction and sentence	Hanna: felony murder and deprivation statute criminalize same conduct so lesser statute should control	Court: if statutes overlap defendant may only be punished under lesser statute, but the proper remedy is dismissal or reversal of felony murder conviction, not imposing sentence for an offense to which defendant did not plead
Effect of a vacated/void sentence on withdrawal of guilty plea	State: trial court’s practice allowing plea withdrawal after sentence is not binding	Hanna: may wish to withdraw plea if sentence vacated	Court: when a sentence is void, it is as if no sentence was entered and defendant may have statutory right to withdraw plea before judgment is pronounced, but Hanna did not move to withdraw and question not ripe

Banta v. State, 281 Ga. 614 (rule of lenity applies only after statutory ambiguity remains)
von Thomas v. State, 293 Ga. 569 (sentence is void if law does not allow imposed punishment)
Gee v. State, 225 Ga. 669 (resolving overlapping statutes may require applying lesser penalty)
Dixon v. State, 278 Ga. 4 (duplicative statutes and sentencing consequences)
Brown v. State, 276 Ga. 606 (effect of rule of lenity where conduct constituted both felony and misdemeanor)
Kaiser v. State, 285 Ga. App. 63 (void sentence treated as no sentence; plea withdrawal before sentencing)
Pierce v. State, 294 Ga. 842 (plea withdrawal after vacated sentence; limits discussed)