State v. Hammer, 305 P.3d 843

Hammer was convicted of criminal possession with intent to distribute methamphetamine after a September 2011 trial in Lake County.
Two weeks before trial Hammer complained by letter that his counsel hadn’t contacted a potential defense witness, Cheryl/Sheryl Combs, seeking new counsel.
The court held an in-chambers meeting prior to trial; Hammer stated no ongoing problems and defense counsel explained the strategy around Combs as a potential rebuttal witness.
Hammer’s attorney later moved for a new trial based on failure to call Combs and alleged ineffective assistance; the court denied as untimely and lacking substantial grounds.
At sentencing the court orally suspended certain costs pending Hammer’s ability to work, but the written judgment later imposed those costs without reflecting the suspension.
On appeal, Hammer challenges the adequacy of the pre-trial inquiry, the denial of a new trial, and the discrepancy between oral pronouncement and the written judgment regarding costs.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Was the pre-trial inquiry into Hammer's counsel complaints adequate?	Hammer asserts the inquiry was insufficient to address substantial complaints.	Hammer's position is that the court should have conducted a further hearing if complaints seemed substantial.	Yes; the inquiry was adequate; no further hearing was required.
Did the district court err in denying Hammer's motion for a new trial?	Hammer contends the September 28, 2011 letter should be treated as a timely motion for a new trial or the court should sua sponte grant one.	State argues the letter addressed another case and did not constitute a motion for a new trial; the 30-day deadline bars relief.	No; the court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion for a new trial.
Did the court err in imposing fees, costs, and surcharges in the written judgment when not orally pronounced?	Hammer argues costs were improperly imposed in the written judgment and questions ability-to-pay inquiry.	State argues the oral pronouncement controlled and the written judgment should be remanded to conform to that pronouncement.	Remand to conform the written judgment to the oral pronouncement; the suspension of costs depended on future employment ability.

State v. Holm, 369 Mont. 227 (2013 MT 58) (adequate initial inquiry standard for new counsel)
State v. Dethman, 358 Mont. 384 (2010 MT 268) (deference to counsel’s strategy; substantiality standard)
State v. Gallagher, 288 Mont. 180 (1998 MT 70) (substantiality of complaints; need for hearing)
State v. Finley, 276 Mont. 126 (1996) (treating a letter with mixed indications as a claim of ineffective assistance)
State v. Brummer, 370 Mont. 43 (2013 MT 113) (inherent power to grant a new trial; time limits for motions)
State v. Baker, 370 Mont. 43 (2013 MT 113) (strict adherence to 30-day deadline for new trial motions)
State v. McCarthy, 324 Mont. 1 (2004 MT 312) (limitations on extending statutory deadlines)
State v. Clark, 346 Mont. 80 (2008 MT 317) (oral pronouncement controls when inconsistent with written judgment)
State v. Goff, 356 Mont. 548 (2011 MT 6) (remand to conform written judgment to oral pronouncement)
State v. Heafner, 356 Mont. 128 (2010 MT 87) (authority to impose conditions on a sentence; statutes authorizing costs)
State v. Micklon, 314 Mont. 291 (2003 MT 45) (exception to contemporaneous objection for illegal sentence)
State v. Lenihan, 184 Mont. 338 (1979) (historical context on sentencing and costs)
State v. Meredith, 2010 MT 27 (2010 MT 27) (constitutional right to counsel)