State v. Greer, 213 Conn.App. 757

Background

Defendant Daniel Greer, a rabbi and dean at an Orthodox high school, was accused by former student E of sexual acts beginning when E was 14–15 and continuing after E turned 16; E reported the abuse in 2016 and Greer was arrested in 2017.
Original information charged four counts each of sexual assault in the second degree (§53a-71(a)(1)) and risk of injury to a child (§53-21(a)(2)), with the charged conduct (anal intercourse and fellatio) underlying both sets of counts.
At the close of evidence defense moved for acquittal on the sexual assault counts under §54-193a (claiming the five-year reporting rule barred prosecution); the state conceded those counts were time-barred and the court granted acquittal on them. The state then proceeded on a substituted information alleging only the four risk-of-injury counts; the jury convicted.
The trial court admitted uncharged-misconduct evidence under Conn. Code Evid. §4-5 — testimony from another student (R) and testimony that Greer and E continued sexual relations after E turned 16 — and gave limiting instructions that the jury must "determine" whether the uncharged misconduct occurred.
On appeal Greer argued (1) the special five-year reporting requirement in §54-193a that the legislature placed on prosecutions under §53a-71(a)(1) should also bar the risk-of-injury prosecutions based on the same conduct, and (2) the jury should have been instructed to apply a specific standard (clear-and-convincing or at least preponderance) when deciding whether uncharged misconduct occurred.

Issues

Issue	State's Argument	Greer (Defendant)'s Argument	Held
Whether the §54-193a five-year reporting requirement (enacted for prosecutions under §53a-71(a)(1)) also bars prosecution under §53-21(a)(2) when both are based on the same conduct	§54-193a’s text expressly limits the additional five-year reporting requirement to violations of §53a-71(a)(1); the legislature omitted §53-21(a)(2) and courts must apply plain statutory language	Applying the shorter reporting limit to sexual-assault counts but not to risk-of-injury counts based on the same acts is illogical and produces disharmony; same conduct should have same limitations	Affirmed. Court held §54-193a is unambiguous; the special five-year reporting rule applies only to §53a-71(a)(1). Risk-of-injury is a distinct offense and different limitation periods may apply.
Whether the jury should have been instructed to apply a particular standard (clear-and-convincing or preponderance) before finding that uncharged misconduct occurred	Relied on Cutler and related authority: no heightened standard required; jury may consider prior misconduct if there is evidence from which it reasonably could conclude the misconduct occurred ("believe" standard suffices)	Requested instruction that the state must prove uncharged misconduct by clear and convincing evidence; argued the trial instruction ("determine") failed to give a standard and risked jury misuse	Affirmed. Claim preserved. Court held the instruction to "determine" was not inferior to the "believe" standard endorsed in Cutler (and is arguably stronger); no error in the limiting instruction.

Key Cases Cited

State v. Cutler, 293 Conn. 303 (Conn. 2009) (trial courts need not instruct jury to apply a heightened standard; juries may consider prior-misconduct evidence if they believe it and it reasonably supports the offered purpose)
State v. George J., 280 Conn. 551 (Conn. 2006) (interpreting the extended limitations provision broadly to reach risk-of-injury when legislative language was expansive)
State v. Bletsch, 281 Conn. 5 (Conn. 2007) (sexual assault and risk of injury are separate, distinct offenses for double jeopardy analysis)
State v. Ortiz, 343 Conn. 566 (Conn. 2022) (reaffirmed Cutler’s approach to jury instructions on prior misconduct)
State v. Ellis, 197 Conn. 436 (Conn. 1985) (courts must apply statutes of limitations as written and should not dismiss serious charges for reasons of judicial policy)