State v. Gray, 2016 UT App 87

Gray pleaded guilty to six felonies (four counts rape of a child, one rape, one aggravated sexual abuse of a child) under an amended plea that fixed older dates to obtain lower mandatory minimums and included the State's recommendation that five counts run concurrently while reserving the right to ask one count run consecutive.
At plea hearing Gray acknowledged rights and signed the agreement; sentencing was scheduled after a PSI documenting repeated abuse over nearly a decade and recommending consecutive sentences.
Defense sought lower minimums (10 years vs. 15) and concurrent sentences on all counts to allow earlier Board review; prosecutor argued facts supported maximums, reiterated the agreed concurrent recommendation for five counts, but said he would ask that the sixth run consecutive and urged the court to impose the maximum punishment within the plea’s range.
The district court imposed 15-to-life on each of the four child-rape counts, 5-to-life on the rape and aggravated sexual abuse counts, and ordered all sentences to run consecutively, yielding an aggregate minimum of 70 years.
On appeal Gray argued (1) the prosecutor breached the plea agreement by asking for the “maximum punishment” and urging harsh sentences contrary to the concurrent recommendation, and (2) the court abused its discretion by imposing consecutive sentences that effectively eliminate meaningful parole prospects.

Issue	Gray's Argument	State's Argument	Held
Did the prosecutor breach the plea agreement at sentencing?	Prosecutor’s request for “maximum punishment” equated to rescinding promised recommendation of concurrent sentences; court should have recognized breach and provided remedy.	Prosecutor argued he honored the agreement (recommended concurrency for five counts and reserved right to ask one consecutive); his rhetoric was within plea’s allowed sentencing range.	No breach; viewed in context prosecutor’s statements did not negate the agreed recommendations and any alleged breach was not obvious to the court. Plain-error standard not met.
Did the district court abuse its discretion by imposing consecutive sentences that effectively deny parole?	Consecutive minimums (70 years) are tantamount to life without parole and deprive the Board of Pardons of meaningful discretion to consider Gray’s rehabilitation during his lifetime.	Statute permits consecutive sentences; since 1996 the Board may release inmates before minimums if mitigating circumstances exist, so lengthy consecutive minimums are not per se equivalent to life without parole; given facts, consecutive sentences were reasonable.	Not an abuse. Consecutive sentences are permitted and not per se invalid; given the gravity, number of victims, and lack of mitigating evidence, the sentencing court did not exceed its discretion.

State v. Smith, 909 P.2d 236 (Utah 1995) (consecutive sentences reversed where stacked minimums effectively foreclosed Board discretion and totality of circumstances did not justify it)
State v. Galli, 967 P.2d 930 (Utah 1998) (consecutive terms reversed where concurrent sentences better served rehabilitative needs and preserved Board flexibility)
State v. Strunk, 846 P.2d 1297 (Utah 1993) (consecutive sentences vacated to afford Board flexibility given defendant’s youth and rehabilitative prospects)
Padilla v. Utah Bd. of Pardons & Parole, 947 P.2d 664 (Utah 1997) (explaining separate roles of sentencing court and Board; Board has authority to commute or terminate indeterminate sentences)
State v. Shaffer, 239 P.3d 285 (Utah Ct. App. 2010) (prosecutor statements at sentencing assessed in context; isolated rhetoric did not necessarily breach plea agreement)