State v. Gray, 112035

Background

At ~2 a.m., Deputy Huntley followed a Ford Focus from I-135, ran its plate, observed suspicious travel and gas-station behavior, and later saw the male driver (Marcus Gray). The deputy testified he was looking for a traffic infraction to stop the car.
The deputy activated his patrol car after observing an alleged failure to signal and stopped Gray; later officers found marijuana and cocaine after arresting Gray.
Gray filed a written motion to suppress alleging an unlawful traffic stop and detention (the written motion did not cite Kansas’s bias-based policing statutes or expressly allege racial profiling). At the suppression hearing Gray argued racial profiling.
The district court denied suppression, focusing on whether a traffic infraction (failure to signal) justified the stop and finding the deputy credible that race did not cause the stop. Gray was convicted at bench trial and sentenced.
The Kansas Court of Appeals accepted that suppression is available for statutory bias-based policing but upheld the denial because it found substantial evidence the stop was not caused by race. Gray sought Supreme Court review.
The Kansas Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) K.S.A. 22-3216(1) provides a suppression remedy for violations of the bias-based policing statutes, and (2) courts must assess whether race (or other protected characteristics) was unreasonably used in deciding to initiate enforcement — not only whether race was the ultimate cause of the stop. The Court vacated convictions and remanded for a new suppression hearing.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (Gray)	Defendant's Argument (State)	Held
Availability of suppression remedy for statutory bias-based policing	K.S.A. 22-3216(1) authorizes suppression when a stop violates K.S.A. 2014 Supp. 22-4609	Suppression limited to constitutional Fourth Amendment claims; statutory remedy not applicable	Court: K.S.A. 22-3216(1) applies; suppression is available for violations of bias-based policing statutes
Proper legal test: "use" vs. "cause" of race in pretextual stops	Court should evaluate whether race was unreasonably used as a factor in deciding to initiate the stop (not just whether race caused the stop)	State relied on evidence that the traffic violation caused the stop and that race did not "cause" it	Court: District courts must examine whether race (or other protected trait) was unreasonably used in deciding to initiate enforcement, not only whether it was the ultimate cause
Burden and procedure for proving bias-based policing at suppression	Gray urged a burden-shifting rule (like Batson) requiring the State to show race-neutral reasons beyond the pretextual basis	State argued credibility and cause-based analysis sufficient; highlighted K.S.A. 22-3216(2) motion requirements	Court: Motion must be written and state facts alleging unreasonable use of protected trait; once alleged, burden shifts to State to prove the search/seizure lawful and that protected traits were not unreasonably used; no special Batson-like additional rule required
Jurisdictional sufficiency of felony marijuana charge	Gray argued charging document failed to allege prior conviction necessary for felony enhancement	State defended sufficiency	Court did not reach merits because convictions were vacated; directed Dunn governs any remand analysis

Key Cases Cited

Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 (stops based on observed traffic offenses are reasonable under the Fourth Amendment despite subjective officer intent)
Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (burden-shifting framework for proving purposeful discrimination in jury selection)
State v. Vrabel, 301 Kan. 797 (discussion of suppression for statutory violations and limits of inherent supervisory suppression)
State v. Sodders, 255 Kan. 79 (state court affirmed suppression based on statutory violation)
State v. DeMarco, 263 Kan. 727 (standard of appellate review for suppression rulings)
State v. Anderson, 281 Kan. 896 (traffic violation provides an objectively valid basis for a stop under Fourth Amendment analysis)
State v. Dunn, 304 Kan. 773 (governs charging challenges and enhancements; noted by Court as controlling guidance on remand)