2020 Ohio 207
Ohio Ct. App.2020Background
- Kenneth W. Goss was indicted in Greene County on multiple drug counts in two linked indictments (2018-CR-939 and 2019-CR-2); the court’s scheduling entry set January 18, 2019 as the plea cut-off date.
- On the morning of the scheduled trial (February 4, 2019) defense counsel moved for a continuance to continue plea negotiations; the court granted the continuance in the 2019 case but denied it in the 2018 case and thereby denied joinder.
- At the plea colloquy Goss entered no-contest pleas to counts in both cases after advisements; the trial court told Goss it would not impose a prison term in the 2019 case and said it would impose monitored time.
- A presentence investigation was ordered; at sentencing (March 29, 2019) the court imposed an effective five-year sentence in the 2018 case (including mandatory time) and imposed concurrent 12-month terms in the 2019 case (contrary to the earlier promise of monitored time).
- Goss appealed, alleging Crim.R. 11 violations (plea not knowing/voluntary), ineffective assistance, denial of continuance/substitution of counsel, defective indictment classification for Count 14, and that the court breached its promise about the 2019 sentence.
- The appellate court affirmed convictions and the 2018 sentence, but found plain error in imposing prison in the 2019 case after promising monitored time; it reversed and remanded limited to imposing monitored time in the 2019 case.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (State) | Defendant's Argument (Goss) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether plea colloquy complied with Crim.R. 11 and produced a knowing, intelligent, voluntary plea | Crim.R.11 was substantially/strictly complied with for nonconstitutional/constitutional items; Goss reviewed discovery and voluntarily pled | Plea was involuntary and made "blind" because court didn’t elicit the specific factual basis and rushed/pressured him | Court found the record shows required advisements and understanding; plea valid as to voluntariness and Crim.R.11 compliance |
| Whether Count 14 was defectively charged (degree/mandatory term) and whether counsel was ineffective for not challenging it | Indictment + bill of particulars (and lab report incorporated) alleged 18.12 g methamphetamine (>5x bulk) sufficient for 2nd-degree aggravated-trafficking; counsel not ineffective | Count 14 should have been a lesser degree; counsel ineffective for not advising otherwise | Court held indictment/bill of particulars sufficed to charge a 2nd-degree offense; Strickland standard not met—no ineffective assistance shown |
| Whether denial of continuance / refusal to accept a plea after plea cut-off and refusal to allow substitution of counsel violated rights | Court policy on plea cut-off (final pretrial) was on-docket; denial of continuance and substitution was within court’s discretion; no showing of prejudice | Denial forced a Hobson’s choice, deprived effective assistance, denied ability to waive speedy trial and to complete plea negotiations | Court applied Unger/Breneman factors, found no abuse of discretion in denying continuance or substitution; policy was a permissible general rule |
| Whether the court breached an express promise (no prison/monitored time in 2019 case) such that sentence must be vacated | State noted defendant didn’t raise error at sentencing and argued no showing sentence would have been different | Court explicitly promised no prison in 2019 case at plea colloquy and defendant relied on it | Court found plain error: promise induced plea and was not honored; reversed 2019 sentence and remanded for imposition of monitored time |
Key Cases Cited
- Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) (ineffective-assistance two-part test: deficient performance and prejudice)
- Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969) (guilty pleas must be voluntary to meet Due Process)
- Michel v. Louisiana, 350 U.S. 91 (1955) (presumption that counsel's conduct is reasonable)
- State v. Veney, 897 N.E.2d 621 (Ohio 2008) (Crim.R.11 requirements and the distinction between strict and substantial compliance)
- State v. Nero, 564 N.E.2d 474 (Ohio 1990) (substantial compliance standard and defendant’s subjective understanding of plea)
- AAA Ents., Inc. v. River Place Community Redevelopment, 553 N.E.2d 597 (Ohio 1990) (definition of abuse of discretion)