State v. Gordon, 260 P.3d 884

Gordon and Bukovsky were charged with second-degree murder for the beating death of Brian Lewis.
The State sought two aggravating factors: deliberate cruelty and particular vulnerability of the victim.
Jury was instructed on the aggravators but the definitions of those terms were not provided; no objection was raised to the lack of definitions.
Jury found both aggravators present and convicted; the trial court imposed exceptional sentences.
Court of Appeals held the lack of definitional instructions was a constitutional error reviewable for the first time on appeal and reversed, vacating the sentences.
Washington Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals, holding no constitutional magnitude error, and affirmed the convictions.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether lack of definitional instructions for deliberate cruelty and particular vulnerability is a manifest constitutional error	Gordon and Bukovsky argue it was a constitutional error.	State contends it is not a constitutional magnitude error under RAP 2.5(a).	No constitutional magnitude error; error not ava ilable for appeal.
Whether Apprendi/Ring framework applies to the instructional definitional omission	Aggravators are elements requiring jury determination like Apprendi/Ring.	These cases do not govern the required instruction detail here.	Not controlling; facilitates jury determination but not required to elaborate definitions.
Sufficiency of the evidence to support the aggravating factors	Lewis’s vulnerability and the cruelty were proven beyond reasonable doubt.	Argues insufficiency of proof for aggravators.	Evidence sufficient to support both aggravators; reasonable jury could so find.
Ineffective assistance of counsel for not requesting pattern jury instructions	Defense failed to request detailed WPIC instructions.	Failure to request did not prejudice, given the lack of constitutional error.	No prejudicial error; ineffective assistance claim rejected.

State v. Aumick, 126 Wash.2d 422 (1995) (defining elements and instructional error)
State v. Stearns, 119 Wash.2d 247 (1992) (definitional terms in instruction not always constitutional error)
State v. Scott, 110 Wash.2d 682 (1988) (elements and instructional adequacy)
State v. Powell, 167 Wash.2d 672 (2009) (aggravating factors/link to elements; beyond standard range)
Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000) (require jury determination of any fact increasing penalty beyond maximum)
Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002) (facts necessary for enhanced sentence are the functional equivalent of elements)
State v. O'Hara, 167 Wash.2d 91 (2009) (manifest error standard; how it affects rights at trial)
State v. Kirkman, 159 Wash.2d 918 (2007) (definition of manifest error and prejudice standard)
State v. Suleiman, 158 Wash.2d 280 (2006) (particular vulnerability requires knowledge and substantial factor in crime)
State v. Tili, 148 Wash.2d 350 (2003) (deliberate cruelty standard: gratuitous violence beyond normal offense conduct)
State v. Grier, 171 Wash.2d 17 (2011) (ineffective assistance framework in context of trial strategy)