State v. Gonzalez
15 A.3d 1049
| Conn. | 2011Background
- Gonzalez had an ongoing feud with the victim, Tirado, in Waterbury.
- On May 5, 2006, Gonzalez and three friends planned to confront Tirado at Bobby Allen's bar, intending to shoot him.
- Two guns were present in the Yukon with the group, and Gonzalez remarked he would pay to have Tirado shot.
- Furs accepted a $1,000 payment from Rodriguez to shoot Tirado; Furs shot Tirado outside the bar, killing him.
- Gonzalez helped dispose of the gun, first hiding it at his mother's yard and later dumping it in Pritchard's Pond; he later provided statements to police admitting involvement and lying initially.
- Gonzalez was charged with multiple counts, including manslaughter in the first degree with a firearm as an accessory under §§ 53a-8 and 53a-55a, and the trial court instructed on accessory liability without requiring Gonzalez to intend the principal's firearm use.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether § 53a-8 requires the accessory to intend the firearm use. | Gonzalez argues Miller is correct; requires intent that the principal use a firearm. | Gonzalez contends the state must prove the accessory intended the firearm use. | Affirmed; dual intent required, but no need to prove accessory's firearm intent. |
| Whether the firearm element in § 53a-55a is an aggravating circumstance with no mental-state requirement for the accessory. | State argues firearm element is an aggravating factor not requiring specific mental state. | Gonzalez argues the accessory must intend the firearm use. | Held: firearm element has general intent; no requirement that accessory intend firearm use. |
| What mental state is required for accessorial liability under § 53a-8 when § 53a-55a applies? | State contends no additional mental state beyond intent to cause serious injury. | Gonzalez relies on Miller to require intent that the firearm be used by the principal. | Held: dual intent required—intent to cause serious physical injury and intent to aid the principal. |
| Is Miller still good law on the elements of accessorial liability for § 53a-55a? | State urges adherence to Miller as controlling precedent. | Gonzalez asks to overrule Miller. | Held: adopt Miller's framework; Miller remains controlling. |
| Does the defense of § 53a-16b affect the accessorial liability analysis? | Not essential beyond affirming that the state must prove underlying elements. | Affirmative defense interacts with proof of elements. | Held: § 53a-16b supports not requiring accessory to intend firearm use. |
Key Cases Cited
- State v. Miller, 95 Conn.App. 362 (Conn. App. 2006) (firearm as aggravating factor—dual intent required for accessorial liability)
- State v. McCalpine, 190 Conn. 822 (Conn. 1983) (accessory liability does not require accessory to intend the specific degree of the offense)
- State v. Crosswell, 223 Conn. 243 (Conn. 1992) (limits on McCalpine; interplay with Foster concerning accessory mental state)
- State v. Foster, 202 Conn. 520 (Conn. 1987) (accessorial liability predicated on requisite mental state; not a distinct crime)
- State v. Heinemann, 282 Conn. 281 (Conn. 2007) (dual intent and mental state in § 53a-8 context; explanation of accessory liability)
- State v. Pierson, 201 Conn. 211 (Conn. 1986) (affirmative action crimes require some mental element; general rule on volitional acts)