State v. Gonzales (Slip Opinion)
2017 Ohio 777
| Ohio | 2017Background
- Appellant (State) sought reconsideration after this Court’s December 2016 opinion (Gonzales I) held that for cocaine-possession penalties the State must prove the weight of the actual cocaine excluding fillers.
- The Sixth District had certified a conflict question about whether the State must prove the weight of the cocaine (exclusive of filler) to reach statutory thresholds in R.C. 2925.11(C)(4)(b)–(f).
- The majority on reconsideration concluded the statute is unambiguous: the phrase "cocaine" (as used in the penalty thresholds) includes a compound, mixture, preparation, or substance containing cocaine, so total weight of the usable drug — including fillers — counts toward thresholds.
- The Court vacated Gonzales I, answered the certified question in the negative (i.e., State need not prove pure cocaine weight), and reversed the Sixth District.
- Separate opinions: a concurrence (agreeing to reverse but disagreeing on granting reconsideration), multiple dissents arguing reconsideration was improper or that the statute is ambiguous and should be construed against the State.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether, for R.C. 2925.11(C)(4)(b)–(f), the State must prove the weight of the actual/pure cocaine (excluding filler) | State: statute penalizes possession by aggregate weight; legislative intent supports weighing the entire usable drug, including fillers | Gonzales: "grams of cocaine" means grams of cocaine as defined in R.C. 2925.01(X); fillers are not "cocaine" and should be excluded; statute ambiguous so construed for defendant | Held: No — measure is total weight of the compound/mixture (including fillers) that forms the usable cocaine; State need not prove purity separately |
| Whether statute is ambiguous, triggering legislative-history or lenity analysis | State: plain meaning and context make statute unambiguous in favor of aggregate weight | Gonzales: statute ambiguous in context of definition and penalty provisions; rule of lenity favors defendant | Held: Court: statute unambiguous; application of legislative history not required (but said it would support result if considered) |
| Whether the term "compound" in definition of cocaine can encompass mixtures/adulterated cocaine | State: statutory definition of "cocaine" includes a "compound, mixture, preparation," which plainly covers adulterated/cut cocaine | Gonzales: "compound" differs from "mixture"; reading them as interchangeable renders "mixture" superfluous | Held: Court: "compound/preparation" language covers common forms of powder cocaine (including adulterants); total usable-drug weight counts |
| Procedural: Whether reconsideration was proper given change in Court membership and prior full consideration | State: timely moved for reconsideration pointing to claimed error in Gonzales I | Several dissenters: motion impermissible reargument and improperly based on changed personnel | Held: Majority granted reconsideration as authorized and corrected Gonzales I |
Key Cases Cited
- Provident Bank v. Wood, 36 Ohio St.2d 101 (1973) (statutory interpretation starts with plain language)
- Cleveland Elec. Illum. Co. v. Cleveland, 37 Ohio St.3d 50 (1988) (courts must give effect to statutory words and may not insert/delete words)
- D.A.B.E., Inc. v. Toledo-Lucas Cty. Bd. of Health, 96 Ohio St.3d 250 (2002) (statutory words must be read in context of the overall statutory scheme)
- Westfield Ins. Co. v. Galatis, 100 Ohio St.3d 216 (2003) (tripartite test for granting reconsideration/overruling precedent)
- State v. Arnold, 61 Ohio St.3d 175 (1991) (rule of lenity applies only when statute is ambiguous)
- Dillon v. Farmers Ins. of Columbus, Inc., 145 Ohio St.3d 133 (2015) (court must give effect to all words in statute; avoid rendering language superfluous)