State v. Gingras
162 N.H. 633
N.H.2011Background
- Defendant Timothy Gingras was convicted of reckless conduct, criminal threatening, and criminal mischief after a jury trial in Superior Court.
- On June 26, 2009, Gingras followed Mangini after a traffic incident, slapped the hood of Mangini’s car, and jumped onto the hood.
- Gingras then withdrew and pointed a handgun at Mangini as Mangini approached the driver's window, threatening to shoot if Mangini did not back away.
- Mangini called 911; police arrested Gingras shortly thereafter.
- On appeal, Gingras challenges only the criminal threatening and reckless conduct convictions, arguing double jeopardy, failure to give self-defense jury instructions, and improper deadly-force instructions.
- The court reverses these two convictions and remands for a new trial on those charges.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Double jeopardy under state/federal constitutions | Gingras argues both offenses require identical proof. | Gingras contends the elements differ and each offense needs distinct proof. | Under both state and federal grounds, there is a difference in required elements; convictions reversed. |
| Self-defense jury instruction on deadly force | State argued defendant’s deadly force claim should be considered; instruction necessary. | Defendant sought a full deadly-force definition despite no firing of weapon. | Trial court erred by not giving full deadly-force instruction; prejudice to defense; reversed. |
| Proper scope of deadly force definition | Court should instruct on deadly force to avoid confusion with deadly weapon. | Reading full RSA 627:9 II allowed to capture non-discharge by pointing a gun as non-deadly. | Full definition required; without it, jury could conflate deadly weapon with deadly force; reversal. |
| Relationship between deadly weapon and deadly force instructions | Jury could infer deadly force from deadly-weapon instruction alone. | No evidence of discharge should not preclude deadly-force analysis. | Instructions must separately define deadly force; erroneous omission prejudiced defense. |
Key Cases Cited
- State v. Farr, 160 N.H. 803 (2010) (double jeopardy and constitutional analysis framework)
- State v. Ball, 124 N.H. 226 (1983) (state constitutional approach; independent of federal guidance)
- State v. Glenn, 160 N.H. 480 (2010) (difference-in-evidence test for same-offense analysis)
- State v. McGurk, 157 N.H. 765 (2008) (elements-focused approach to multiple offenses)
- State v. Ford, 144 N.H. 57 (1999) (difference in evidence test for double jeopardy)
- State v. Liakos, 142 N.H. 726 (1998) (analysis of indictments and elements)
- State v. Sanchez, 152 N.H. 625 (2005) (transactional overlap does not defeat separate elements)
- State v. McMinn, 141 N.H. 636 (1997) (self-defense evidentiary burden and standard)
- State v. Bruneau, 131 N.H. 104 (1988) (distinguishing theory of defense from theory of the case)
- State v. Drake, 155 N.H. 169 (2007) (standard for reviewing jury instructions)
- State v. Pierce, 152 N.H. 790 (2005) (statutory interpretation; words given effect)
- State v. Kousounadis, 159 N.H. 413 (2009) (deadly weapon vs. deadly force distinction)
- State v. Johnson, 157 N.H. 404 (2008) (instruction adequacy; standard of review)
