State v. Gailey, 2016 UT 35

Background

On June 17, 2018, Shanelle Gailey entered an initial appearance, was appointed counsel, waived preliminary hearing and trial, pled guilty to criminal trespass, waived the minimum two-day sentencing waiting period, and was immediately sentenced.
Gailey later filed a notice of appeal challenging the voluntariness of her plea; she did not file a pre-sentencing motion to withdraw the plea.
The court of appeals questioned jurisdiction and certified the constitutional and jurisdictional issue to the Utah Supreme Court.
The central statutory provision is Utah Code § 77-18-6 (Plea Withdrawal Statute), which requires motions to withdraw a plea be filed before sentence is announced and mandates postconviction relief under the PCRA for post-sentencing challenges.
Gailey argued the statute does not bar a direct appeal and, if it does, that it is unconstitutional under Utah Const. art. I, § 12 because the PCRA does not guarantee state-paid counsel or effective assistance of counsel.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether the Plea Withdrawal Statute bars a direct appeal after sentencing	Gailey: statute is permissive; it does not strip appellate jurisdiction and allows direct appeal post-sentencing	State: statute requires pre-sentencing withdrawal or postconviction relief; post-sentencing claims must proceed under the PCRA	Statute bars direct appeals after sentencing; post-sentencing plea challenges must proceed via the PCRA
Whether the Plea Withdrawal Statute facially violates the state constitutional right to appeal	Gailey: statute denies meaningful appellate review because PCRA lacks guaranteed counsel/effective assistance	State: statute provides an alternative route (PCRA) including appellate review; does not eliminate appeal right	No facial violation: statute prescribes procedure but does not foreclose appellate review because PCRA allows collateral attack and eventual appellate review
Whether mandatory PCRA route is unconstitutional as applied for lack of state-paid counsel	Gailey: she may be denied appointed counsel on PCRA, making the remedy inadequate	State: appointment is discretionary but available; no showing this will occur	Not ripe: Gailey has not sought PCRA relief or shown she was denied counsel; speculative claims are premature
Whether inadequate or ineffective PCRA counsel would render statutory scheme unconstitutional	Gailey: ineffective postconviction counsel would deny meaningful appeal	State: ineffective-assistance claims in PCRA are not cognizable until they occur	Not ripe: no actual denial or ineffective assistance has occurred, so claim cannot be adjudicated now

Key Cases Cited

Migliore v. Livingston Fin., LLC, 347 P.3d 894 (Utah 2015) (standard of review for appellate jurisdiction and questions of law)
Injured Workers Ass'n v. State, 374 P.3d 14 (Utah 2016) (constitutional challenges to statutes reviewed for correctness)
State v. Ostler, 31 P.3d 528 (Utah 2001) (interpreting filing period for plea withdrawal and jurisdictional effect)
State v. Abeyta, 852 P.2d 993 (Utah 1993) (discussing pre-1989 practice on plea withdrawal timing)
Grimmett v. State, 152 P.3d 806 (Utah 2007) (recognizing the 2008 amendment and that untimely motions deprive courts of jurisdiction to review pleas)
State v. Merrill, 114 P.3d 585 (Utah 2005) (addressing jurisdictional nature of plea-withdrawal timing)
Missouri v. Frye, 566 U.S. 134 (U.S. 2012) (Supreme Court recognition of plea-bargaining centrality)
Lafler v. Cooper, 566 U.S. 156 (U.S. 2012) (Supreme Court on prejudice and plea negotiations)
Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551 (U.S. 1987) (no constitutional right to counsel in state postconviction proceedings)
Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722 (U.S. 1991) (limits on federal habeas review and counsel in postconviction proceedings)