State v. G. Spottedbear, 2016 MT 243

Background

Gale Spottedbear, intoxicated, was asked to leave a Great Falls Wal‑Mart after a disturbance and was arrested for disorderly conduct. While being transported, Officer Mike Walker told him he would also be charged with criminal trespass. Spottedbear then threatened to kill Walker, his pregnant wife, and his family and referenced a prior incident in which he had assaulted Walker.
The State charged Spottedbear with threats and other improper influence in official matters (§ 45‑7‑102(1)(a)(i), MCA), criminal trespass, and disorderly conduct; a jury convicted on all counts.
At trial the District Court permitted testimony about a prior incident between Spottedbear and Officer Walker (but excluded any evidence of convictions) and gave a limiting instruction under M. R. Evid. 404(b) and 403.
On appeal Spottedbear argued: (1) the improper influence statute is facially overbroad (raised for the first time on appeal), (2) insufficient evidence supported the improper influence and trespass convictions, (3) the prior‑incident evidence was inadmissible, and (4) trial counsel was ineffective for not challenging the statute and for failing to object to the jury instruction defining “purpose.”
The Supreme Court of Montana affirmed the improper influence conviction, held that the evidence was insufficient for criminal trespass, found no abuse of discretion in admitting the prior‑incident evidence, and rejected the ineffective‑assistance claim (as to prejudice).

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (State)	Defendant's Argument (Spottedbear)	Held
1. Is § 45‑7‑102(1)(a)(i) (improper influence) facially overbroad?	Statute validly prosecutes threats made to influence public servants.	Statute reaches substantial protected speech (broad definition of “harm”; not limited to unlawful harm; targets political speech).	Declined to address facial overbreadth; trial counsel not ineffective for failing to raise it because statute has a plainly legitimate sweep.
2. Was there sufficient evidence that Spottedbear threatened Walker with the purpose to influence Walker’s official discretion?	Yes — threats began only after Walker said he would charge trespass; jury could infer purpose from timing, content, and prior assault history.	Threats were drunken, belligerent conduct (like Plenty Hawk) with no evidence of a specific purpose to influence official action.	Affirmed: sufficient evidence to support jury finding of purpose to influence.
3. Was there sufficient evidence for criminal trespass (revocation of privilege and remaining unlawfully)?	Manager’s report and officer’s instruction to leave permitted an inference that privilege was revoked and officer acted on manager’s behalf.	No proof an authorized person revoked privilege and no proof Spottedbear remained after being told to leave.	Reversed trespass conviction: no sufficient evidence he remained unlawfully after being told to leave.
4. Was admission of prior incident with Officer Walker improper or unduly prejudicial?	Prior incident was admissible to show motive, intent, knowledge, absence of mistake; limiting instruction reduced unfair prejudice.	Prior incident was minimally probative and highly prejudicial (improper propensity inference).	Admission proper under M. R. Evid. 404(b) and 403; no abuse of discretion.

Key Cases Cited

Lilburn v. State, 265 Mont. 258 (discussing limits of the overbreadth doctrine and realistic danger standard)
Plenty Hawk v. State, 285 Mont. 183 (threats by an intoxicated, belligerent defendant behind bars — insufficient evidence of purpose)
Keating v. State, 285 Mont. 463 (upholding improper influence conviction where threats followed officers’ attempt to serve process)
Motarie v. State, 323 Mont. 304 (threats to a key witness can support inference of purpose to influence cooperation)
Clausell v. State, 305 Mont. 1 (circumstantial evidence and inference of mental state sufficient for conviction)
Weigand v. State, 328 Mont. 198 (standard for sufficiency review in criminal cases)
Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601 (overbreadth requires that the statute reach a substantial amount of protected speech)