State v. G.K., 2022 Ohio 2858

G.K. was indicted in 2009 on multiple counts (rape, gross sexual imposition, kidnapping, obstructing justice, tampering); he pleaded guilty to obstructing justice and the state dismissed the other counts as part of a plea deal.
In 2014 G.K. applied to the trial court to seal the records of the dismissed counts; at that time he was not eligible to have the obstructing-justice conviction sealed because of prior convictions.
Relevant Ohio statutes: the conviction-sealing statute (former R.C. 2953.32), the nonconviction-sealing statute (R.C. 2953.52), and the multicount-sealing provision (former R.C. 2953.61) governing related counts with different dispositions.
The trial court denied the sealing motion (citing the multicount provision). A divided Eighth District reversed, holding the nonconviction statute allowed sealing of individual dismissed counts and that courts have inherent authority to seal records beyond the statutes.
The Ohio Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals, holding the nonconviction-sealing statute does not permit sealing dismissed counts when a conviction remains and that courts cannot invoke inherent authority to bypass the statutory scheme; the trial court’s denial was reinstated.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (G.K.)	Defendant's Argument (State)	Held
Whether R.C. 2953.52 permits sealing of dismissed counts within a multicount indictment when the indictment also contains a conviction	R.C. 2953.52 authorizes sealing of dismissed counts; court may seal individual counts	R.C. 2953.52 applies only when the person was acquitted or the complaint/indictment/information was dismissed (not when only some counts were dismissed)	Held: No. The statute requires acquittal or dismissal of the case; dismissed counts in an indictment with a conviction cannot be sealed under R.C. 2953.52
Effect of the multicount-sealing provision (R.C. 2953.61) on sealing individual counts	Applicant contended multicount provision did not bar sealing dismissed counts	State argued multicount provision prevents sealing until all related counts are eligible	Held: Not decided by the Ohio Supreme Court here—the State did not appeal the court of appeals’ conclusion on this point, so the Court had no occasion to resolve it
Whether a court has inherent authority to seal records not authorized by statute	Court of appeals: Pepper Pike permits inherent authority to seal in exceptional cases; trial court could use that power	State: Where the legislature has provided a statutory scheme, courts may not use inherent authority to override it	Held: No. Courts may not invoke inherent authority to circumvent clear statutory provisions governing record sealing when the legislature has addressed the matter

State v. Pariag, 137 Ohio St.3d 81 (2013) (interpreting R.C. 2953.61 to require eligibility to seal all related offenses before any may be sealed)
State v. LaSalle, 96 Ohio St.3d 178 (2002) (statutory law in effect at time of filing controls sealing application)
State v. Futrall, 123 Ohio St.3d 498 (2009) (a court cannot order that all official records in a case be sealed while maintaining a conviction)
Pepper Pike v. Doe, 66 Ohio St.2d 374 (1981) (courts may use inherent authority to seal records in unusual circumstances in the absence of statutory guidance)
State v. Radcliff, 142 Ohio St.3d 78 (2015) (legislative enactment of nonconviction-sealing statute displaced reliance on Pepper Pike for nonconvictions)
Hulsmeyer v. Hospice of Southwest Ohio, Inc., 142 Ohio St.3d 236 (2014) (legislative inaction in one provision where action was taken in another indicates deliberate choice)