State v. G.E.P.
205 A.3d 1155
| N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. | 2019Background
- Consolidation of four criminal appeals where CSAAS (Child Sexual Abuse Accommodation Syndrome) expert testimony was admitted; defendants convicted of child sexual assault and sentenced to lengthy prison terms.
- J.L.G. (2018) narrowed admissibility of CSAAS expert evidence: only delayed disclosure component remains potentially admissible under N.J.R.E. 702 when the reasons for delay are beyond a juror’s common understanding.
- All four trials admitted CSAAS testimony (Drs. D’Urso and Lippmann) after victims testified; cross-examination focused on delay, inconsistencies, and retraction.
- Appellate panel applied J.L.G. retroactively (pipeline retroactivity) because the rule addresses truth-finding and risk of unjust convictions, and relatively limited number of pending appeals would be affected.
- Court found CSAAS testimony in these cases exceeded J.L.G. limits, underminined the defense’s ability to challenge credibility, and, in C.K.’s case, the trial court also failed to give the specific CSAAS jury instruction. All four convictions were reversed and remanded for new trials.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether J.L.G. announced a new retroactive rule | State: J.L.G. refines admissibility but should not disturb past convictions broadly | Defendants: J.L.G. should apply to pending appeals to remedy unreliable expert evidence | Court: J.L.G. is a new rule warranting pipeline retroactivity to pending direct-review cases |
| Admissibility of CSAAS testimony under N.J.R.E. 702 | State: Experts explain child behavior and bolster credibility where appropriate | Defendants: CSAAS (except delayed disclosure) lacks reliable scientific basis and unfairly bolsters complainant | Court: CSAAS generally inadmissible except limited delayed-disclosure explanation when beyond juror knowledge; testimony here exceeded that scope |
| Whether admission of CSAAS testimony was harmless error | State: Some cases may have independent corroboration making error harmless | Defendants: CSAAS testimony was central and impaired cross-examination, creating reasonable doubt | Court: In these four cases corroboration was weaker than in J.L.G.; admission was prejudicial and not harmless |
| Jury instruction adequacy regarding CSAAS | State: General expert instruction suffices | Defendants: Specific limiting model charge required to prevent juror misuse | Court: General instruction was insufficient (notably in C.K.); failure to give proper CSAAS charge warrants reversal |
Key Cases Cited
- State v. J.L.G., 234 N.J. 265 (N.J. 2018) (narrows CSAAS admissibility to limited delayed-disclosure explanation under N.J.R.E. 702)
- State v. J.Q., 130 N.J. 554 (N.J. 1993) (earlier decision permitting CSAAS testimony)
- State v. Henderson, 208 N.J. 208 (N.J. 2011) (retroactivity analysis and balancing administration-of-justice concerns)
- State v. Feal, 194 N.J. 293 (N.J. 2008) (framework for determining whether a decision announces a new retroactive rule)
- State v. Burstein, 85 N.J. 394 (N.J. 1981) (options for prospective, pipeline, or full retroactivity)
- State v. Knight, 145 N.J. 233 (N.J. 1996) (three-factor retroactivity balancing, with emphasis on purpose of rule)
- State v. Cassidy, 235 N.J. 482 (N.J. 2018) (example of retroactive relief where new rule addressed significant truth-finding defects)
- State v. Macon, 57 N.J. 325 (N.J. 1970) (error reversible when it raises reasonable doubt whether verdict would have been different)