169 Conn. App. 500
Conn. App. Ct.2016Background
- On Jan. 11, 2011, Levarr Frasier (defendant) and co‑actor Travis James were implicated in a drive‑by shooting in New Haven; William Brown died and Adrian Redmond was injured. Redmond identified James and "Bolo" (Frasier) at the hospital; other witnesses and an acquaintance (George White) provided post‑shooting statements implicating Frasier.
- Frasier was arrested, gave statements to police, and was tried twice: first trial ended in a mistrial; second trial charged him as principal or accessory for murder, assault in the first degree, and carrying a pistol without a permit.
- The jury acquitted on murder but convicted on lesser included manslaughter in the first degree with a firearm, first‑degree assault, and illegal carrying; the court sentenced Frasier to 40 years.
- On appeal Frasier challenged (1) the trial court’s jury instructions on accessorial liability (arguing they were misleading, inconsistent about presence, and improperly merged offenses) and (2) prosecutorial impropriety in closing (alleged burden‑shifting and misstatement of witness testimony).
- The trial court had instructed on principals first, then gave a single accessorial‑liability charge under Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a‑8, read statutory language and provided jurors with written model instructions; it also answered a jury question with an illustrative example (bank‑robbery hypothetic).
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (State) | Defendant's Argument (Frasier) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the court’s "intentionally aid" instruction misled the jury | Instruction correctly required both (1) intent to commit underlying offense and (2) intent to assist the principal; thus lawful | Instruction allowed conviction for any conduct with the requisite intent rather than conduct that actually aided the principal | Court: Instruction viewed as a whole correctly required both levels of intent; not misleading |
| Whether telling the jury presence/participation "is not necessary" contradicted statement that mere presence is insufficient | Phrase properly distinguished that physical presence is not required so long as intentional aid + same intent are proven | Statements were flatly inconsistent and could confuse jurors—here presence and active participation were required by the facts | Court: No inconsistency; statements clarified the difference between mere presence and intentional aiding; bank‑robbery example remedied any ambiguity |
| Whether a single accessorial instruction improperly merged offenses (failed to tie intent/conduct to each charge) | Jury was separately instructed on each substantive offense then on accessorial liability requiring the same intent as the principal for each offense | Single accessorial charge could permit conviction of one offense based on intent for a different offense (merging) | Court: Instructions, read as a whole, required the same intent for the particular offense; no unlawful merger or dilution of burden |
| Whether prosecutor committed reversible impropriety in closing (burden shift; mischaracterizing White’s testimony) | Prosecutor’s remarks were speculation about defense theories and reasonable inferences from the evidence; burden remained with the state; characterization of White’s statements was a permissible inference | Prosecutor shifted burden by implying defendant needed a "convincing" defense; misstated White’s phrase (omitted "I think") and added "that night," making testimony more incriminating | Court: No impropriety sufficient to deprive Frasier of a fair trial; remarks were fair comment and reasonable inferences from evidence; no burden shift or impermissible misstatement |
Key Cases Cited
- State v. Golding, 213 Conn. 233 (Conn. 1989) (framework for review of unpreserved constitutional claims)
- State v. Hines, 89 Conn. App. 440 (Conn. App. 2005) (improper jury instructions on elements are of constitutional dimension)
- State v. Otto, 305 Conn. 51 (Conn. 2012) (limits on prosecutor argument; deference to reasonable inferences from evidence)
- State v. Warholic, 278 Conn. 354 (Conn. 2006) (prosecutor may argue reasonable inferences from the evidence)