State v. Foster, 102 N.E.3d 1199

David Foster was convicted in 2005 of conspiracy, drug possession, and drug trafficking; his sentences were vacated and remanded multiple times, with a final resentencing on September 4, 2008.
At the 2008 resentencing the court merged possession and conspiracy into the trafficking count and imposed consecutive terms: 10 years for trafficking and a seven‑year mandatory term for a major‑drug‑offender specification.
The 2008 judgment included language declaring Foster "not eligible for intensive prison program, transitional control, judicial release, or any other early release program and is to serve this sentence in its entirety."
Foster filed multiple postconviction motions over the years; in 2015 he filed a "Motion to Vacate, Set‑Aside, and Resentence Due to Void Judgment" challenging the early‑release exclusions and alleging the judgment was void for other reasons (including merger clarity).
The trial court overruled the 2015 motion; on appeal this court held the motion was mostly not cognizable under postconviction or criminal‑rule procedures but concluded the court had jurisdiction to correct as void those portions of the judgment that improperly excluded him from "any other early release program" and ordered him to "serve his sentence in its entirety."
The court modified the judgment to dismiss the motion, affirmed as modified, and remanded for correction of the unauthorized early‑release exclusion language in the sentencing entry.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether the trial court had authority to exclude defendant from all early‑release programs and order he "serve his sentence in its entirety"	State: The court's exclusions were within sentencing authority (esp. for intensive program, transitional control, and judicial release)	Foster: The blanket exclusion and "serve in its entirety" language unlawfully removed statutory early‑release eligibility (including earned‑credit) and thus rendered those parts void	Court: Parts of exclusion were void — court lacked statutory authority to bar "any other early release program" or order to "serve in its entirety," so those portions are correctable as void; however restrictions on intensive program, transitional control, and judicial release were authorized and not void
Whether the 2008 judgment was void for failing to clearly indicate merger/allied‑offense disposition	State: Judgment and prior remand orders show possession and conspiracy were merged into trafficking; merger was implemented	Foster: The judgment failed to clearly indicate which counts merged and that he has a single conviction	Court: No jurisdiction in this appeal to review merger claim (it was not raised in the 2015 motion); judgment reflects the merger and is not demonstrably void; assignment overruled

State v. Foster, 109 Ohio St.3d 1 (Ohio 2006) (addresses sentencing principles applied on direct appeal)
State ex rel. Cruzado v. Zaleski, 111 Ohio St.3d 353 (Ohio 2006) (a court always has jurisdiction to correct a void judgment)
State v. Fischer, 128 Ohio St.3d 92 (Ohio 2010) (only statutory sentences are authorized; errors in imposing a sentence do not render a valid sentence void)
State v. Williams, 148 Ohio St.3d 403 (Ohio 2016) (reaffirming that unauthorized sentences are void and correctable at any time)
State v. Beasley, 14 Ohio St.3d 74 (Ohio 1984) (distinguishing void sentences from correctable sentencing errors)