State v. Fortune, 2015 Ohio 4019

On April 25, 2014, Eric B. Fortune, Jr. was indicted on multiple felonies including aggravated burglary, felonious assault, kidnapping, having weapons under disability; three counts carried three-year firearm specifications.
Fortune pleaded guilty to Counts One (aggravated burglary), Four (felonious assault), Five (kidnapping) with firearm specifications, and Count Six (weapons under disability); other counts were nolled; the parties jointly recommended a 19-year aggregate sentence.
At plea, defense counsel and the court discussed whether all three firearm specifications could run consecutively; counsel said he believed they could.
At sentencing the court imposed: five years each on Counts One, Four, and Five (Counts One and Four concurrent with each other and consecutive to Count Five), 18 months on Count Six (concurrent), and three years on each firearm specification, ordered consecutive to each other and to the underlying terms, for an aggregate 19 years.
Fortune appealed arguing (1) the court erred by imposing sentence on all three firearm specifications (invoking merger/same-act rules and double jeopardy) and (2) trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by misstating the law at plea.
The majority affirmed, holding R.C. 2929.14(B)(1)(g) authorizes sentencing on two mandatory specifications and permits (in the court’s discretion) additional specification terms; counsel’s statements did not prejudice Fortune.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (State)	Defendant's Argument (Fortune)	Held
Whether sentencing on all three firearm specifications was lawful	Statute permits mandatory sentencing on two specs and allows the court discretion to impose terms for remaining specs; the joint recommendation was authorized by law	The third firearm specification should have merged because the felonies arose from the same act/transaction, so only two spec-terms may be imposed	Court: R.C. 2929.14(B)(1)(g) authorizes imposition of two mandatory spec-terms and permits additional spec-terms in the court’s discretion; sentencing on three specs was lawful and statute-controlled merger analysis was unnecessary
Whether trial counsel was ineffective for statements at plea about consecutive gun specs	Counsel’s statements reflected his reading of law and did not mislead; defendant was advised of maximum exposure and received agreed 19-year sentence	Counsel misadvised court and defendant regarding whether all three specs would run consecutive and relied on 'separate victims' rationale	Court: Counsel’s statements were not objectively deficient in a way that caused prejudice; no reasonable probability of a different outcome because defendant got the agreed 19-year term after proper advisals

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (ineffective assistance standard)
State v. Madrigal, 87 Ohio St.3d 378 (approving Strickland framework in Ohio ineffective-assistance review)
State v. Bradley, 42 Ohio St.3d 136 (prejudice prong standard for plea-related errors)
State v. Underwood, 124 Ohio St.3d 365 (discussion of limits on appellate review when sentence is jointly recommended and authorized by law)
State v. Damron, 129 Ohio St.3d 86 (concurrent sentences do not equal merger of allied offenses)