315 Conn. 500
Conn.2015Background
- Defendant Anthony Flemke, his girlfriend Kelly Danforth, and Chadwick Matzdorff planned to rob a drug seller; Matzdorff carried out the robbery with an airsoft gun while Flemke drove and waited nearby.
- Matzdorff later confessed and implicated Flemke and Danforth; Flemke and Danforth were tried jointly and convicted of first‑degree robbery as accessories and conspiracy to commit robbery in the first degree.
- The state sought and the jury found, pursuant to Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53-202k, that a firearm was used in the robbery, triggering a mandatory consecutive five‑year enhancement; the trial court imposed the enhancement on Flemke although he was unarmed.
- Flemke appealed, arguing § 53-202k applies only to persons who actually use or are armed with a firearm, and alternatively that an unarmed accomplice should only be exposed to enhancement if he intended that a firearm be used.
- The Supreme Court affirmed, rejecting Flemke’s calls to overrule or limit State v. Davis and holding that accessorial liability under § 53a-8(a) makes unarmed accomplices subject to § 53-202k enhancement without separate proof of intent that a firearm be used.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether § 53-202k applies to unarmed accomplices | State: § 53-202k applies when a class A–C felony is committed and a firearm is used by any participant; accomplices are punishable as principals under § 53a-8(a) | Flemke: § 53-202k’s plain text refers only to persons who use or are armed with a firearm and thus should not apply to unarmed accomplices; Davis should be overruled | Court: Affirmed Davis; § 53a-8(a) makes accomplices legally indistinguishable from principals for § 53-202k enhancement, so it applies to unarmed accomplices |
| Whether § 1-2z (plain‑meaning rule) requires overruling Davis | State: Davis is consistent with § 1-2z because § 53-202k must be read with § 53a-8(a) | Flemke: § 1-2z (enacted after Davis) codifies plain meaning and mandates limiting § 53-202k to principals only | Court: § 1-2z did not abrogate prior cases like Davis; reading § 53-202k with § 53a-8(a) is consistent with § 1-2z |
| Whether an unarmed accomplice must intend that a firearm be used to trigger § 53-202k | State: No separate intent required; conviction as an accessory plus proof a firearm was used suffices | Flemke: Enhancement should apply only if accomplice intended another would use a firearm | Court: No intent element required for enhancement; Davis and related precedent foreclose requiring specific intent |
| Whether legislative acquiescence or subsequent practice supports Davis | State: Legislature’s inaction post‑Davis plus subsequent cases adopting Davis reasoning support retaining it | Flemke: Legislative enactment of § 1-2z signals change in interpretive approach | Held: Court infers legislative acquiescence to Davis and declines to overturn it |
Key Cases Cited
- State v. Davis, 255 Conn. 782 (2001) (holding § 53-202k applies to unarmed accomplices via § 53a-8(a))
- Hummel v. Marten Transport, Ltd., 282 Conn. 477 (2007) (§ 1-2z does not retroactively overrule prior judicial interpretations)
- State v. Peeler, 271 Conn. 338 (2004) (applied accessorial liability principles to aggravating factors in capital sentencing)
- State v. Gonzalez, 300 Conn. 490 (2011) (no requirement that accessory intend another would use a firearm when aggravating circumstance does not demand specific intent)
- State v. Patterson, 276 Conn. 452 (2005) (§ 53-202k is a sentence enhancement and jury must find firearm use)
- State v. Rice, 172 Conn. 94 (1976) (proof of knowledge is required for possession offenses; distinguished here as inapposite)