State v. Fernando V., 331 Conn. 201

Background

Defendant Fernando V. was convicted by a jury of multiple sexual offenses against his stepdaughter B, including second‑degree sexual assault and risk of injury to a child. The Appellate Court reversed on evidentiary grounds; this opinion is a dissent from that reversal.
At trial the court excluded testimony from P, B’s longtime boyfriend, who would have testified that over four years he observed no behavioral signs (withdrawal, academic decline, eating disorders, suicidal ideation, etc.) that an expert testified can accompany sexual‑abuse trauma.
The defense offered P’s testimony to challenge B’s credibility and to rebut the state expert’s testimony about expected behavioral signs of abuse; the state contended exclusion was proper (issues about relevance, expertise, and cumulativeness were raised in various stages).
The prosecution’s case lacked physical evidence but included circumstantial corroboration: D (the defendant’s son) testified he observed secretive conduct between B and the defendant on two occasions and gave a prior statement describing B putting on her belt after being in a locked bedroom with the defendant.
The dissenting justice (Robinson, C.J.) agrees P’s testimony may have been admissible but concludes its exclusion was harmless error: B and her mother G had already testified about B’s conduct (undermining the novelty of P’s testimony), the state’s expert conceded trauma signs are not consistently present, and D’s corroborative statements strengthened the state’s case.

Issues

Issue	State's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether exclusion of P’s testimony requires reversal	Exclusion was proper (various grounds raised below, and argument that the testimony was cumulative)	P’s testimony was material to impeach B and to rebut expert testimony on trauma signs	Dissent: Exclusion was at most harmless — jury not substantially swayed; would affirm trial court if reached on harmlessness basis
Standard and application of harmless‑error review for nonconstitutional evidentiary errors	N/A (focus on whether trial court abused discretion)	Error in excluding admissible evidence requires reversal if it substantially affected the verdict	Applied Eleck standard: nonconstitutional error is harmless when appellate court has fair assurance it did not substantially affect verdict; dissent finds fair assurance here
Role of corroborating circumstantial evidence when physical evidence is absent	Case weak without physical evidence; exclusion harmed defense credibility case	Circumstantial evidence (D’s observations) provided corroboration and strengthened state’s case despite lack of physical evidence	Dissent: circumstantial evidence and lack of jury deadlock support harmlessness
When appellate court may affirm on alternative grounds not argued below	State asked to rely on cumulativeness ground on appeal; majority declined as unpreserved	State urged cumulativeness as alternative ground to affirm	Dissent notes tension in precedent but declines to decide that preservation question here given harmlessness conclusion

Key Cases Cited

State v. Eleck, 314 Conn. 123 (2014) (harmless‑error framework for nonconstitutional evidentiary rulings)
State v. Ritrovato, 280 Conn. 36 (2006) (considerations when excluding evidence that bears on complainant credibility in sexual‑assault cases)
State v. Whelan, 200 Conn. 743 (1986) (adopting hearsay exception for signed prior inconsistent statements and their use at trial)
State v. Beavers, 290 Conn. 386 (2009) (circumstantial evidence can render improper evidentiary rulings harmless when overall case is strong)
State v. Favoccia, 306 Conn. 770 (2012) (improper expert testimony that bolsters complainant credibility can be harmful when credibility is central and evidence is weak)
State v. William C., 267 Conn. 686 (2004) (exclusion of records that directly contradict complainant can be harmful where credibility is pivotal)
State v. Parris, 219 Conn. 283 (1991) (standards for excluding cumulative evidence)