State v. Farris, 492 P.3d 744

Defendant (19) pleaded guilty to second-degree sexual abuse of a 16‑year‑old who presented as much younger; he had moved in with the victim and her mother and engaged in sexual activity after cultivating trust.
Sentenced to five years’ probation with special condition #9: defendant shall not enter into or participate in any “intimate or sexual relationship or encounter (such as dating, romantic, or otherwise sexual) with any person without prior written permission from the supervising officer.”
The condition was not discussed at sentencing and first appeared in the judgment; defendant challenged it on appeal.
Defendant argued the condition is unconstitutionally vague under Article I, §§20 and 21 of the Oregon Constitution and the Fourteenth Amendment, and overbroad under the Fourteenth Amendment (freedom of association, privacy, marriage, familial rights).
The State defended the condition as sufficiently clear (context narrows “intimate” to sexual relationships), and as reasonably related to probation goals (public safety and rehabilitation), with the supervising officer available to clarify borderline situations.
The Court affirmed, holding the condition neither unconstitutionally vague nor overbroad.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (State)	Defendant's Argument (Farris)	Held
Vagueness under Oregon Constitution and federal Due Process	Wording (“sexual,” examples) narrows "intimate" to sexual relationships; officer can provide guidance	"Intimate" is too broad/vague, grants uncontrolled discretion, fails to give fair notice	Not vague under state or federal law: surrounding words and examples clarify meaning and officer guidance cures any residual uncertainty
Overbreadth / freedom of association and fundamental rights	Condition is reasonably related to probation goals given offense (abusive sexual relationship with minor); limited in scope/duration and permits relationships with officer approval	Condition could bar ordinary family, religious, social interactions and infringes rights to marriage, privacy, association	Not overbroad: targets potentially sexual relationships, narrowly tailored to protect public and rehabilitate given defendant's offense; intrusion permissible while on probation

Penn v. Board of Parole, 365 Or 607 (clarified that "intimate" is ambiguous absent contextual narrowing)
State v. Graves, 299 Or 189 (fair‑notice vagueness standard under Oregon Constitution)
State v. Rogers, 352 Or 510 (terms that are indeterminate raise vagueness concerns but interpretation by officers may suffice)
Long v. Board of Parole, 189 Or App 56 (probation officer guidance can clarify condition meaning)
State v. Plowman, 314 Or 157 (similarity of federal and Oregon vagueness analyses)
United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112 (probationers’ liberty is diminished; reasonable conditions may limit rights)
Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352 (vagueness doctrine: avoid arbitrary enforcement)
Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644 (recognition of fundamental rights relating to marriage)
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (protection of intimate adult consensual conduct)