State v. Evick, 2020 Ohio 3072

Background

Defendant Jason T. Evick was accused of holding his girlfriend, Jennifer Snider, captive in a rented camper in Clinton County in March 2017 and repeatedly assaulting and raping her; Snider escaped after an incident in Clermont County and reported the events to police.
Clermont County prosecuted Evick for domestic violence and abduction based on a specific assault in the vehicle; Evick was convicted and that conviction was previously affirmed on appeal.
Clinton County later indicted Evick for rape, kidnapping (dismissed pretrial on double jeopardy grounds), domestic violence, and felonious assault based on separate, discrete acts inside the camper between March 13–15, 2017.
At the Clinton County trial the state presented Snider’s testimony, photographic and medical evidence of injuries, and crime-scene observations from a search of the camper; a witness statement (from a deceased neighbor) was admitted through a detective.
The jury convicted Evick of domestic violence and felonious assault (not guilty of rape); Evick appealed raising (1) double jeopardy, (2) due-process/spoliation of evidence, and (3) ineffective assistance of counsel.

Issues

Issue	State's Argument	Evick's Argument	Held
Whether Clinton County convictions for domestic violence and felonious assault violate double jeopardy given earlier Clermont County domestic-violence conviction	The convictions rest on discrete acts in Clinton County distinct from the Clermont County assault	The convictions arise from a single continuous course of conduct, so subsequent prosecution and conviction constitute double jeopardy	Court: No double jeopardy — the Clermont conviction was based on a separate assault in Clermont County; Clinton convictions are for discrete acts in the camper
Whether failure to secure the camper (allowing removal of blankets/personal items) violated due process by spoliation	No bad faith by law enforcement; deputies followed policy and obtained a warrant within a reasonable timeframe	Sheriff’s office had duty to secure scene promptly; removal of items potentially useful to defense shows bad faith	Court: No due-process violation — missing items were only potentially useful, no evidence of bad faith, and Evick did not show how items would help his defense
Whether trial counsel was ineffective for eliciting hearsay from a deceased witness through cross-examining the detective (which provoked Evick)	Counsel’s questioning aimed to show the witness denied seeing injuries; strategy was reasonable and did not prejudice defendant	The questioning introduced corroborating hearsay that prejudiced Evick and provoked his loss of composure before the jury	Court: No ineffective assistance — counsel’s strategy was reasonable, the record lacks a reasonable probability of a different outcome given corroborating medical and physical evidence

Key Cases Cited

State v. Mutter, 150 Ohio St.3d 429 (2017) (Ohio and federal Double Jeopardy Clauses provide coextensive protections)
State v. Gustafson, 76 Ohio St.3d 425 (1996) (double jeopardy protects against successive prosecutions, successive prosecutions after conviction, and multiple punishments)
United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435 (1989) (distinguishing types of double jeopardy and related remedies)
Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) (suppression of material, favorable evidence violates due process)
Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51 (1988) (when lost evidence is only potentially useful, defendant must show bad faith to establish due-process violation)
State v. Geeslin, 116 Ohio St.3d 252 (2007) (applies Youngblood standard in Ohio; bad-faith requirement for failure-to-preserve claims involving only potentially useful evidence)
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) (two-prong test for ineffective assistance: deficient performance and prejudice)
State v. Hester, 45 Ohio St.2d 71 (1976) (Ohio recognition of right to effective assistance of counsel)
State v. Johnson, 112 Ohio St.3d 210 (2006) (defendant bears burden to prove counsel’s performance was deficient and prejudicial)