State v. Everette
129 Ohio St. 3d 317
| Ohio | 2011Background
- Everette was convicted of aggravated murder, aggravated robbery, grand theft, and weapon under disability; sentenced to life with parole eligibility after 28 years.
- Videotapes of trial, suppression hearing, and sentencing were filed on August 26, 2008; written transcripts of the suppression hearing and trial followed on October 15, 2008.
- Appellate counsel requested transcripts; the state moved to dismiss postconviction petition as untimely under R.C. 2953.21(A)(2) and 2953.23.
- Everette filed a postconviction petition on April 8, 2009, claiming ineffective assistance and arguing the 180-day period began with the written transcripts.
- The trial court and appellate court held the petition untimely; the Supreme Court granted review to define when a “trial transcript” accrues for postconviction-relief timing.
- The Court held that when both videotaped and written transcripts exist and are certified, only the written transcript starts the 180-day clock.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| What constitutes the trial transcript for 180-day timing | Everette contends the 180 days start Oct. 15, 2008 (written transcripts) | State contends the clock starts Aug. 26, 2008 (videotapes) | 180-day period begins Oct. 15, 2008; petition timely |
| Role of written transcript under App.R. 9(A) when a videotape exists | Written transcript certification governs; videotape is not controlling | Videotape alone could trigger timing unless a certified written transcript exists | When a certified written transcript exists, it governs the timing; videotape alone is not controlling |
Key Cases Cited
- State v. Hollingsworth, 118 Ohio St.3d 1204 (2008-Ohio-1967) (statutory interpretation and definitions related to transcripts)
- Brookwood Presbyterian Church v. Ohio Dept. of Edn., 127 Ohio St.3d 469 (2010) (use of ordinary meaning for undefined terms; statutory construction principles)
- Brenders v. Hall, 71 Ohio St.3d 632 (1995) (words not defined interpreted by usual meaning)
- Cassels v. Dayton City School Dist. Bd. of Edn., 69 Ohio St.3d 217 (1994) (statutory interpretation and ordinary meaning of terms)