State v. Ellis
164 A.3d 829
| Conn. App. Ct. | 2017Background
- Defendant Ricky Ellis, age 16 at offense, participated in a 2007 drive-by shooting that killed Mark Morgan.
- At the time he committed the offense he was on probation for a prior larceny conviction.
- In December 2008 (age 18) Ellis pled guilty under the Alford doctrine to accessory to manslaughter in the first degree with a firearm in exchange for an 18-year sentence; the court imposed that sentence in March 2009.
- In June 2015 Ellis filed an amended motion to correct an illegal sentence arguing the court failed to consider his youth (Eighth Amendment) and that Public Act 15-84 required retroactive parole-review or resentencing under Miller and Graham.
- The trial court dismissed the motion, concluding Ellis’s sentence was not the functional equivalent of life without parole and that it lacked authority to resentence parole under P.A. 15-84.
- On appeal the court affirmed, relying on State v. Delgado to hold that P.A. 15-84 rendered juveniles with parole eligibility ineligible to claim they face life without parole and that Miller/Graham did not require resentencing here.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the sentencing was illegal because the court failed to consider youth under Miller | State: sentence lawful; no Miller relief required when sentence not life without parole | Ellis: Miller and Graham require consideration of youth and a new sentencing hearing or parole-review | Court: Dismissed motion; sentence not equivalent to life without parole; Miller/Graham do not mandate resentencing here |
| Whether P.A. 15-84 requires retroactive resentencing or parole re‑calculation | State: P.A. 15-84 makes defendant parole-eligible; trial court cannot resentence parole under the statute | Ellis: P.A. 15-84 entitles him to retroactive review and parole eligibility adjustments, warranting resentencing | Court: P.A. 15-84 made defendant parole-eligible; thus he cannot claim a life-without-parole sentence; trial court properly dismissed motion |
| Whether Graham guarantees a meaningful opportunity for release applicable here | State: Graham applies to juvenile life-without-parole; not implicated if parole eligibility exists | Ellis: Graham entitles juveniles to a chance for release based on maturity/rehabilitation | Court: Not implicated because defendant’s sentence includes parole eligibility |
| Whether Alford plea affects ability to seek Miller/Graham relief | State: Valid plea and sentence stand; substantive Eighth Amendment claims tied to sentence type, not plea form | Ellis: Despite Alford plea, Eighth Amendment protections apply to juvenile offenders' sentences | Court: Plea valid; Eighth Amendment doctrines (Miller/Graham) inapplicable to this non-LWOP sentence |
Key Cases Cited
- Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012) (juvenile life‑without‑parole requires consideration of youth before imposing such a sentence)
- Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010) (juveniles serving life or its functional equivalent must have a meaningful opportunity for release)
- State v. Delgado, 151 A.3d 345 (Conn. 2016) (P.A. 15‑84 renders juvenile offenders parole‑eligible and limits Miller/Graham relief where parole exists)
- North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970) (guilty plea under the Alford doctrine can be valid despite defendant's assertion of innocence)
- State v. Williams‑Bey, 144 A.3d 467 (Conn. App. 2016) (discusses Miller/Graham applicability and definition of ‘‘functional equivalent’’ of life without parole)
