State v. Elifritz, 2016 Ohio 7193

Darion R. Elifritz was indicted in adult court at age 21 on five sex-related felonies for conduct that occurred when he was between about 15 and 18.
He pled guilty (as part of a plea bargain) to two counts of attempted rape, two counts of gross sexual imposition, and one count of importuning.
The trial court imposed a suspended three-year prison term, three years of community control, ordered sex-offender treatment, and classified him as a Tier III sex offender (lifetime registration and notification).
Elifritz challenged the Tier III classification on appeal, arguing (1) the adult automatic classification creates an unconstitutional irrebuttable presumption when applied to juvenile offenders (due process), and (2) mandatory lifetime Tier III classification of juvenile offenders is cruel and unusual punishment.
He also argued ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to object to the Tier III classification.
The appellate court reviewed those claims (though Elifritz did not raise them below) and affirmed the Tier III classification and rejection of the ineffective-assistance claim.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether applying adult Tier III registration to someone who committed offenses as a juvenile creates an unconstitutional irrebuttable presumption (due process)	The State: adult classification statutes apply and are constitutional as written	Elifritz: adult automatic classification treats juvenile conduct as if adult, denying required individualized juvenile-delinquency procedures and creating an irrebuttable presumption	Court: No. R.C. 2152.02(C)(3) treats persons charged after age 21 as adults for those acts; due-process challenge fails.
Whether mandatory lifetime Tier III classification for juvenile-era offenses is cruel and unusual punishment	The State: registration is regulatory and constitutional; applicable here because defendant prosecuted as adult	Elifritz: lifelong Tier III registration is severe and unconstitutional for someone who committed offenses as a juvenile	Court: No. Eighth Amendment arguments (relying on juvenile mitigation cases) do not extend to registration; C.P. and related cases inapplicable because defendant prosecuted in adult court.
Whether counsel was ineffective for failing to object to Tier III classification	The State: even with an objection, classification would stand, so no prejudice	Elifritz: counsel's failure deprived him of the chance to have the court consider the statute's constitutionality	Held: No ineffective assistance — constitutional claims lack merit, so no prejudice shown.

State v. Awan, 22 Ohio St.3d 120 (Ohio 1986) (constitutional objections to a statute generally must be raised at first opportunity in trial court)
In re M.D., 38 Ohio St.3d 149 (Ohio 1988) (plain error review in criminal cases under Crim.R. 52(B))
State v. Barnes, 94 Ohio St.3d 21 (Ohio 2002) (plain-error relief should be exercised with utmost caution)
State v. Long, 53 Ohio St.2d 91 (Ohio 1978) (standard for recognizing plain error)
State v. Warren, 118 Ohio St.3d 200 (Ohio 2008) (R.C. 2152.02(C)(3) means persons charged after age 21 are not "children" for those acts)
State v. Walls, 96 Ohio St.3d 437 (Ohio 2002) (no constitutional violation in trying person as adult for offenses committed while juvenile)
In re C.P., 131 Ohio St.3d 513 (Ohio 2012) (lifelong registration/notification on a juvenile offender is severe because of stigmatization when still a minor)
Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (U.S. 2012) (mandatory life without parole for juvenile homicide violates Eighth Amendment)
Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011 (U.S. 2010) (Eighth Amendment prohibits mandatory life without parole for juveniles convicted of nonhomicide offenses)
Roper v. Simmons, 125 S. Ct. 1183 (U.S. 2005) (Eighth Amendment prohibits death penalty for offenders who were juveniles at time of offense)