State v. Elder, 368 N.C. 70

On Sept. 23, 2010 a district court issued an ex parte Domestic Violence Protective Order (DVPO) under N.C.G.S. § 50B-3 after defendant made threats; the order required surrender of firearms under § 50B-3.1 and additionally ordered any law enforcement officer serving the order to search the defendant’s person, vehicle, and residence and seize any weapons.
The DVPO contained no findings of probable cause that weapons were present and made no finding that the defendant owned or possessed weapons.
Officers served the DVPO three days later, took the defendant’s keys, entered the locked house, arrested him on a separate arrest warrant, and searched the home; officers found a marijuana grow operation and charged the defendant with drug offenses.
Defendant moved to suppress the evidence, arguing the district court lacked statutory authority to order a search under the DVPO and that the warrantless search violated the Fourth Amendment and state constitutional protections.
The superior court denied suppression; defendant pled guilty while reserving appellate review; a divided Court of Appeals reversed and suppressed the evidence, and the State appealed to the North Carolina Supreme Court.
The Supreme Court modified and affirmed the Court of Appeals: it held § 50B-3(a)(13) does not authorize ordering law enforcement to search a person, vehicle, or residence via DVPO, and the warrantless search here violated the Fourth Amendment and Article I, § 20 of the North Carolina Constitution.

Issue	State's Argument	Elder's Argument	Held
Whether N.C.G.S. § 50B-3(a)(13) authorizes a court to order law enforcement to search a defendant’s person, vehicle, and home as part of an ex parte DVPO	Broad reading of “any additional prohibitions or requirements” permits the court to order searches deemed necessary for protection	§ 50B-3(a)(13) is limited to imposing duties or prohibitions on parties to the DVPO; it does not authorize orders directing law enforcement to conduct searches	§ 50B-3(a)(13) does not authorize courts to order searches by law enforcement under a civil DVPO; statute construed according to plain language and constitutional limits
Whether the warrantless search was constitutionally permissible without probable cause or exigent circumstances	Search was justified by protective needs and victim safety concerns implicit in DVPO enforcement	No warrant, probable cause, or exigent circumstances existed to justify entry and search; DVPO alone cannot substitute for a warrant	Warrantless search violated the Fourth Amendment and Article I, § 20; no special-needs or exigent-circumstance exception applied

Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs.’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602 (warrant requirement protects privacy; special-needs exception narrow)
Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868 (special needs can justify departures from warrant/probable cause in limited contexts)
New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325 (school-search special-needs framework)
Lemons v. Old Hickory Council, Boy Scouts of Am., Inc., 322 N.C. 271 (statutory language controls when clear)
Smith v. Keator, 285 N.C. 530 (interpret statutes consistent with constitutional protections)
State v. Allison, 298 N.C. 135 (warrant generally required for home entry absent exigent circumstances)
State v. Grice, 367 N.C. 753 (home afforded highest constitutional protection against searches and seizures)