State v. Drakes
2013 WL 2990650
Conn. App. Ct.2013Background
- Roosevelt Drakes pleaded guilty to murder and firearm possession in April 2005 and was sentenced to 30 years; at sentencing he was informed convicted felons must submit DNA samples under § 54-102g.
- While in DOC custody in December 2009–March 2010, Drakes repeatedly refused directed requests to provide a blood/biological sample and refused to sign advisement forms.
- The state filed (May 2010) a motion for permission to use reasonable physical force to obtain Drakes’ DNA sample; the trial court granted the motion but stayed enforcement pending appeal (AC 33327).
- Separately, Drakes was arrested and prosecuted under § 54-102g(g) for refusing to provide a DNA sample; he was convicted by a jury in January 2011 and sentenced to one year consecutive to his existing sentence (AC 34570).
- On appeal Drakes challenged (1) court jurisdiction to authorize use of force, (2) whether § 54-102g permits force, (3) due process and ex post facto application, and (4) double jeopardy from being prosecuted postconviction for refusal.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (State) | Defendant's Argument (Drakes) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Subject-matter jurisdiction to rule on motion to use reasonable force | Court has jurisdiction to decide motion; order is final regarding permission | Court lacked jurisdiction; order improper | Court had jurisdiction; appeal from final judgment upheld |
| Does § 54-102g authorize reasonable physical force to obtain DNA | Statute is regulatory and reasonably read to permit force to effectuate DNA collection | Legislature never authorized use of force; statute does not allow it | Use of reasonable force is authorized/inherent to effectuate the statute; motion properly granted |
| Application of § 54-102g to a 2005 convict violates due process / ex post facto | Statute is regulatory, not punitive; prospective enforcement and procedural in nature | Applying the statute retroactively or to sentences imposed earlier violates ex post facto and due process | Statute is regulatory, not punitive; no ex post facto or due process violation as applied |
| Double jeopardy / multiple punishment for prosecuting refusal after conviction | Prosecution for refusal is a separate, postconviction crime and procedure (not additional punishment for underlying offense) | Prosecuting refusal constitutes additional punishment for the original conviction (multiple punishment) | No double jeopardy violation; refusing to give a sample is new postconviction conduct and a separate offense |
Key Cases Cited
- Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299 (same-act test for whether two statutory violations are separate offenses)
- State v. Banks, 143 Conn. App. 485 (Conn. App. 2013) (treating § 54-102g as regulatory and permitting reasonable force to obtain DNA)
- State v. Alexander, 269 Conn. 107 (Conn. 2004) (standards for plenary review of jurisdictional questions)
- State v. Kasprzyk, 255 Conn. 186 (Conn. 2000) (double jeopardy principles applied through Fourteenth Amendment)
- State v. Lonergan, 213 Conn. 74 (Conn. 1989) (three guarantees of double jeopardy explained)