State v. Drakes
146 A.3d 21
Conn.2016Background
- Roosevelt Drakes, convicted of murder and firearm possession in 2005, was told he must provide a DNA sample under Conn. Gen. Stat. § 54-102g.
- Drakes repeatedly refused department requests in 2009–2010; the state sought a court order permitting the use of reasonable physical force to obtain a sample and later charged him under § 54-102g(g) for refusal.
- The trial court (Feb. 8, 2011) authorized reasonable force and later denied Drakes’ motion to dismiss the criminal charge; a jury convicted him of the misdemeanor refusal charge and he received one year consecutive sentence.
- The Appellate Court affirmed both the trial court’s authorization to use reasonable force and the conviction, holding § 54-102g to be regulatory (not punitive) and that the prosecution did not violate double jeopardy or due process.
- The Supreme Court granted certification, adopted the companion reasoning in State v. Banks, and affirmed the Appellate Court: trial court had jurisdiction and § 54-102g permitted reasonable force; the statute is regulatory and the refusal prosecution did not violate double jeopardy or due process.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (State) | Defendant's Argument (Drakes) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether trial court had jurisdiction and § 54-102g (pre-2011 amendment) authorized reasonable physical force to obtain DNA | Statute is regulatory; court may order reasonable force as necessary to effectuate the statutory scheme | § 54-102g did not authorize use of force; only remedy was criminal prosecution under § 54-102g(g) | Trial court had jurisdiction and § 54-102g implicitly authorized reasonable force (court adopted Banks reasoning) |
| Whether prosecution/conviction under § 54-102g(g) violated due process or double jeopardy | Statute is remedial/regulatory, not punitive; prosecution is for distinct post-conviction refusal and not additional punishment for original crimes | Compelled DNA and criminal sanction are punitive or constitute double punishment for same offense | Statute is regulatory (not punitive); prosecution punished separate conduct (refusal) and thus did not violate due process or double jeopardy |
Key Cases Cited
- Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299 (double jeopardy test: whether each statute requires proof of an element the other does not)
- Whalen v. United States, 445 U.S. 684 (analysis re: multiple punishments and statute characterization)
- Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144 (factors for determining whether a statute is punitive)
- State v. Waterman, 264 Conn. 484 (Conn. test for regulatory v. punitive characterization)
- State v. Kasprzyk, 255 Conn. 186 (state constitutional protection coextensive with federal double jeopardy protection)
- State v. Alexander, 269 Conn. 107 (discussion of multiple punishments and double jeopardy principles)
- Minnesota Methane, LLC v. Dep’t of Public Utility Control, 283 Conn. 700 (adoption of companion opinion reasoning)
- Rocque v. Mellon, 275 Conn. 161 (adoption of companion opinion reasoning)
