State v. Douglas C., 195 Conn.App. 728

Defendant Douglas C., Jr. was tried and convicted by a jury of five counts of risk of injury to a child (Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53-21(a)(2)) for sexual/indecent contact with the intimate parts of five female minors who attended gatherings at his home after he moved to Connecticut in September 2005.
Count Three concerned victim C, who testified that the defendant grabbed her breasts over her shirt on multiple occasions between September 2005 and her sixteenth birthday (September 22, 2006); she was unable to provide precise dates.
The state conceded insufficiency on one count (sexual assault in the second degree) and the trial court granted acquittal as to that count; it denied the defendant’s motions for acquittal on the remaining § 53-21 counts.
The defendant requested specific-unanimity jury instructions for several counts; the court gave one specific instruction as to Count Four only and refused specific unanimity on Counts One, Three, Five, and Six.
On appeal the defendant argued (1) insufficient evidence as to Count Three—claiming the Stephen J. R. three‑factor test is inapplicable or not satisfied—and (2) the court’s refusal to give specific unanimity instructions deprived him of a unanimous verdict. The Appellate Court affirmed.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (State)	Defendant's Argument (Douglas)	Held
Whether the Stephen J. R. three‑factor test applies to C’s nonspecific testimony and whether that testimony was sufficient to sustain conviction on Count Three	Stephen J. R. applies where abuser has ongoing access regardless of victim age; C’s testimony met the three factors (type of act, at least one occasion, general time frame)	Stephen J. R. should be limited to very young children; C’s testimony was too nonspecific and inconsistent to prove the act occurred before age 16	Test applies regardless of age when facts fit (ongoing access/repeated acts); C’s testimony satisfied factors 1–3 (sufficient to prove at least one contact before age 16); conviction upheld
Whether the trial court erred by refusing to give specific unanimity instructions for Counts 1, 3, 5, and 6	No specific unanimity required when the state charges a single statutory subdivision once and presents evidence of repeated violations; general unanimity instruction suffices	Jury must be unanimous as to the specific occasion of the prohibited contact; refusal to give specific unanimity risked nonunanimous verdicts	No error: specific unanimity instructions are required only when differing, conceptually distinct statutory alternatives/elements are presented; repeated acts under the same statutory subsection are not conceptually distinct; general unanimity instruction was adequate

State v. Stephen J. R., 309 Conn. 586 (Conn. 2013) (adopts three‑factor test for assessing sufficiency of generic/nonspecific child testimony in repeated‑abuse cases)
People v. Jones, 51 Cal. 3d 294 (Cal. 1990) (source of the three‑factor approach; age is not dispositive and precise dates are not elements)
State v. Famiglietti, 219 Conn. 605 (Conn. 1991) (framework for when a specific unanimity instruction is required for alternative statutory theories)
State v. Benite, 6 Conn. App. 667 (Conn. App. 1986) (example where specific unanimity required because defendant’s liability depended on conceptually distinct statutory subdivisions)
United States v. Gipson, 553 F.2d 453 (5th Cir. 1977) (federal example of requiring unanimity where statute proscribed conceptually distinct categories of conduct)
State v. Spigarolo, 210 Conn. 359 (Conn. 1989) (holding that multiple acts of contact under § 53-21 are not conceptually distinct for unanimity purposes)
State v. Mancinone, 15 Conn. App. 251 (Conn. App. 1988) (limits the rule requiring specific unanimity instructions to counts based on multiple statutory subsections or elements)