State v. Dickinson
233 Ariz. 527
| Ariz. Ct. App. | 2013Background
- Dickinson and the victim (C.H.) had prior disputes; Dickinson threatened C.H. with an ax and said he would kill him shortly before the incident.
- The victim was struck and run over while riding a bicycle by an extended-cab Ford Ranger; he sustained a concussion, head lacerations requiring stitches, a broken ankle, and other injuries.
- A witness testified Dickinson parked and waited, then ran the victim down and drove off; Dickinson later allegedly returned, tossed keys to a friend and said he had done it.
- Dickinson was indicted for attempted second-degree murder and other felonies; his defense at trial was mistaken identity and complete noninvolvement (not lack of intent).
- The court, without objection, instructed the jury that second-degree murder could be committed if the defendant "either did so intentionally or knew that his conduct would cause death or serious physical injury," allowing attempted murder conviction on a finding of knowledge of serious physical injury.
- The jury convicted Dickinson of attempted second-degree murder; he appealed, arguing the instruction misstated the law and constituted fundamental, prejudicial error.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (State) | Defendant's Argument (Dickinson) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the jury instruction misstated the mens rea for attempted second-degree murder | The instruction tracks statutory language and permits conviction where defendant intended death or knew conduct would cause death or serious injury | Instruction erroneously allowed conviction based on knowledge of serious physical injury (not death) | Court: Instruction was erroneous under Ontiveros (only intent to kill or knowledge that conduct would cause death satisfies attempted murder) |
| Whether the error was "fundamental" given no contemporaneous objection | State contended error did not undermine fairness given evidence and theories | Dickinson argued instructing a non-existent theory is fundamental error | Court: Error was fundamental because it relieved State of proving an element of the offense (jury could convict on a non-existent theory) |
| Whether Dickinson proved prejudice from the fundamental error | State argued no prejudice because its theory and evidence consistently showed intent to kill; defendant’s defense was misidentification/noninvolvement | Dickinson argued jury might have convicted on the lesser mental state (knowledge of serious injury) | Court: No prejudice shown — considering State’s consistent theory (intent to kill), defense (complete denial), evidence (threats, conduct, injuries), and arguments, a properly instructed jury would not have reached a different result |
Key Cases Cited
- State v. Ontiveros, 206 Ariz. 539 (App. 2003) (attempted second-degree murder requires intent to kill or knowledge conduct would cause death)
- Henderson v. Kibbe, 431 U.S. 145 (1977) (failure to object at trial limits appellate review; rare reversal without objection)
- State v. Henderson, 210 Ariz. 561 (2005) (framework for fundamental error review in Arizona criminal cases)
- United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506 (1995) (an instruction that relieves the prosecution of proving an element may be unconstitutional)
- State v. James, 231 Ariz. 490 (App. 2013) (defendant bears burden to show error, fundamentality, and prejudice)
- State v. Kemper, 229 Ariz. 105 (App. 2011) (instructing on a non-existent theory can be fundamental error)